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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Revenge is a ubiquitous theme in human relations. It has influenced human
activity at all levels of social analysis from the international to the interpersonal. One
needs only to read a newspaper or watch the nightly news to observe this.

For

example, the shooting of workers by disgruntled co-workers (Lamar, 2001); the murdersuicides at Columbine High School (Gibbs, Grace, Gwynne, Harrington, Jackson,
Shapiro, & Woodbury/Littleton, 1999), or the mass murders at Virginia Tech University
(Gibbs, 2007). Such incidents have attracted great attention and have been discussed
at length by social commentators. Some observers imply revenge as the primary reason
for the perpetration of these extreme acts. While such opinions may have some merit in
the eventual understanding of these and similar events, hindsight analysis does not
provide a sufficient explanation.
Scientific methodology might lead to a more precise understanding of some of
the factors contributing to such tragedies. Although revenge has been a theme in many
cultures throughout history, investigators in the behavioral sciences only recently have
given their sustained attention to the exploration of social and psychological factors
related to revenge (Vidmar, 2002; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007).
The fact that the aforementioned examples are extreme and do not occur with
great frequency does inhibit the ability of researchers to bring such events under
empirical investigation. While most acts of revenge do not end in extreme violence,
such examples do draw attention to a more common psychological event that many
people experience at some point in their lifetime – to think about and/or exact revenge
on those they believe have wronged them.

Many people experience interpersonal
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offenses of varying degrees. However, not all people punish those they believe have
wronged them. When confronted with circumstances they perceive as necessitating
redress, many people seek help from authorities (Tyler, 1988). Nonetheless, some
people may be disposed to think and act out of revenge in their everyday social
interactions.
Those who experience thoughts and feelings of revenge will be the primary focus
of this research. The present work will pursue two broad directions. First, important
theoretical approaches as well as empirical research on revenge will be reviewed.
Second, on the basis of an analysis of past theorizing and research, some new insights
into the psychological study of revenge will be proposed along with a strategy for
empirically testing hypotheses derived from this analysis.
Psychological Approaches to the Study of Revenge
Because revenge has been construed primarily as a behavioral construct, many
efforts have focused on the exploration of precipitating factors which influence resulting
behavioral acts of revenge. These factors have been approached in the psychological
literature in a number of different ways. Some investigators have explored revenge from
the perspective of social and group norms (e.g., Gouldner, 1960; Helm, Bonama, &
Tedeschi, 1972; Nisbett, 1993; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen, 1998;
Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage, & Rohdieck, 2004).

Others have attached greater

importance to understanding revenge as the product of individual psychological
variables. Revenge has been discussed alternatively as a motivation (e.g., Heider,
1958; McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 1998), an attitude
(e.g., Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; Hutt, Iverson, Bass, & Gayton, 1997) and a
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personality dimension (e.g., McCullough et al., 2001). Additionally, some approaches
are difficult to categorize, focusing mainly on basic cognitive variables such as the
attribution processes of revenge seekers (see Bradfield & Aquino, 1999).
While it is appropriate to recognize that broader social processes such as cultural
and/or normative influences may be important in understanding revenge, such
considerations would increase the complexity of the present research to the extent that
its original purposes could become obscured. For the sake of clarity, the discussion
presented here will focus on the comparatively simplest construal of revenge (i.e., an
interaction between perceived harm-doer and revenge seeker). The goal is to obtain a
greater understanding of the social-cognitive and affect-regulatory processes involved in
revenge at the intrapersonal level.
Motivational Approach
The motivational approach to the study of revenge follows from the work of
Heider (1958). Treating revenge as the product of motivation provides some
advantages over normative approaches to revenge. First, it allows for a clearer account
of the psychological factors related to revenge, such as a more precise consideration of
cognitive and affective processes of revenge seekers. In other words, what do revenge
seekers think and feel? Likewise, identifying individual motives allows for a broader
consideration of possible explanations for revenge.

Instead of presenting a broad

explanation, such as the operation of normative or cultural influences, conceptualizing
revenge as the product of motivation can specify a set of possible explanatory
alternatives.
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A number of motivations have been offered as theoretical explanations for
revenge. McCullough, et al. (2001) discuss three of these. The first is a basic need for
people to maintain equity relationships with others (e.g., Adams, 1965). The desire for
people to ‘get even’ with those perceived to have wronged them shares much in
common with the negative reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 1960). Indeed, it is not too clear
how these two concepts differ from each other, unless perceptions of equity are
construed as the cognitive basis of negative reciprocity.
Acts of revenge often derive from the need for people to get even with others.
However, other factors such as the moral instructive function provide an additional
motivational account of revenge (see Heider, 1958). This motive is somewhat different
from the equity motive in that people seek to teach a perceived offender a lesson that
his or her behavior is not acceptable. Acts of revenge serve to reinforce this objective.
The moral instructive function typically does not adhere to an equity formulation since
the revenge exacted may be proportionately greater in magnitude than the original
offense.

In this way, revenge can be viewed as providing an offender with an

unambiguous indication that his offending behavior will not be tolerated in the present or
on future occasions. This motive can be seen as one intending to produce behavior
modification for the good of both the offender and the greater community.
Finally, saving face has been identified as a motive for revenge. Like the moral
instructive motive, this typically involves the use of an inequitable response. The intent
of this motive is punitive in nature and its instrumentality is related to the goal of
deterring future offences in the service of preserving the status as well as the selfesteem of the revenge seeker (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).
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Some motivational accounts of revenge share much with ideas in the broader
literature on human aggression.

An idea discussed frequently in that literature is

instrumental aggression. Instrumental aggression is carried out to serve a particular
purpose (Buss, 1961; Feshbach, 1964; Berkowitz, 1993). Bushman and Anderson
(2001) define instrumental aggression as “…premeditated, calculated behavior that is
motivated by some other goal (e.g., obtain money, restore one’s image, restore justice)”
(p. 274). From this perspective, revenge is understood as a variant of instrumental
aggression, which implies the revenge seeker’s awareness of the purposes of his
intended behavior. Indeed, much of the psychological research investigating revenge is
consistent with this revenge-as-instrumental aggression formulation.

For example,

McCullough, et al. (2001) state: “Although some acts of vengeance might be
spontaneous and impulsive, we posit that motivations to seek revenge frequently result
from ruminative thinking about the offense” (p.602).

While this motivated-planning

approach to revenge may account for a large proportion of variance in revenge
behavior, the emphasis on revenge as being subsumed by a concept such as
instrumental aggression can be problematic because it largely ignores the instrumental
versus hostile aggression distinction that has become a mainstay in the aggression
literature (for a review, see Bushman & Anderson, 2001).
Hostile aggression is often characterized as being qualitatively different from
instrumental aggression (Buss, 1961; Berkowitz, 1993).

These differences arise

primarily when one considers the cognitive and affective attributes of each.
Instrumental aggression is typically referred to as ‘cold’ aggression and is viewed as the
product of deliberative planning, the relative absence of anger, with the primary goal of
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achieving something other than harm. On the other hand, hostile aggression is typically
seen as ‘hot’ and is characterized by a lesser degree of premeditation, the presence of
anger, with the ultimate goal of harm itself.

Since revenge has often been

conceptualized as a motivated behavior, research mostly has overlooked the possibility
that a discernable proportion of revenge behavior may be better understood as being
characterized in a similar manner as hostile aggression.
In addition, a careful consideration of revenge-as-motivated behavior leaves one
without a clear understanding of which motives have the greatest impact on revenge.
Several possibilities can be deduced from this. First, one could assert that the various
motivations have equal weight and act simultaneously to influence revenge. Second,
one could hypothesize that one motive is more influential than others. Finally, it is
possible that revenge can be explained as being the product of multiple or mixed
motivations.

These sorts of questions have been largely set aside in the revenge

literature. Attempts at solutions to these questions have been trumped by research on
attitudinal aspects of revenge as well as research on vengefulness as a personality
dimension – which similarly view motivation as an important component in explaining
revenge, but fail to directly address questions of motivation in any programmatic
manner.
Although there may be promise in studying revenge from a motivational
perspective, the current state of the revenge literature has not sustained efforts on
delineating a more precise account of the various motives implicated in revenge.
Instead, researchers have placed a greater emphasis on examining the influence of
attitudes and personality variables on revenge.

The specific reasons for the de-
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emphasis of the role of motivation remain elusive given that the related area of
forgiveness research has given motivational issues more attention (see McCullough &
Hoty, 2002).
Attitude Approach
While the attitude perspective as applied to the study of revenge is not
necessarily incompatible with normative or motivational perspectives, it has provided
researchers with a more traditional social psychological approach to the study of
revenge. Although the attitude approach had been applied to conceptually related areas
such as people’s attitudes toward capital punishment (e.g., Allen, Mabry, & McKelton,
1998), attitude research on revenge has been slow to develop. Noting the lack of
available measuring instruments, Stuckless and Goranson (1992) developed the
Vengeance Scale. This work contributed to the advancement of the field in a couple of
important ways. First, since few prior studies had specifically assessed revenge as a
product of attitudes, Stuckless and Goranson (1992) developed a reliable and valid
measure of people’s attitudes toward revenge, uncontaminated by social desirability
response bias. Second, subsequent research (Holbrook, White, & Hutt, 1995; Hutt, et
al., 1997) demonstrated that Vengeance Scale scores were normally distributed and
unidimensional. This is important because it showed that the measure possessed the
necessary variance for the development of meaningful hypotheses linking revenge
attitudes to other psychological processes and variables, which then can provide a
basis for the further exploration of more complex questions which arise when
contemplating the totality of factors contributing to revenge.
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Research either directly or indirectly inspired by the work of Stuckless and
Goranson (1992) has yielded some important findings. Studies have linked individual
differences in revenge attitudes to a variety of outcomes such as driver aggression
(Hennessy & Wiesenthal, 2005), spectator aggression at sporting events (Hennessy &
Schwartz, 2007), health outcomes (Little, Simmons, & Nelson, 2007), workplace
aggression (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002), as well as school violence (Duck, 2004).
Although the applied importance of these studies cannot be overestimated, they seem
to suffer from a lack of theoretical direction. It is not surprising that a person’s attitudes
can at times predict one’s behavior. The findings that revenge attitudes can predict a
wide range of aggressive behaviors merely serves as another illustration of the more
widely studied attitudes-predicting-behavior phenomenon (for reviews, see Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993; 1998).
While on the surface, such findings do appear to provide a basic explanation for
revenge behavior, they fail to provide a deeper understanding of the more specific
cognitive and affective processes of people who hold pro-revenge attitudes.

For

example, research from the attitude perspective assumes that revenge attitudes are
explicit, meaning that people who hold these attitudes maintain a discernable level of
awareness of them. Considering the accumulating evidence for the existence of implicit
attitudes in other domains of research (see Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998;
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000), one might suggest that at least some revenge
attitudes are driven by factors that cannot be assessed with traditional self-report
measures.

In this regard, research from the attitude perspective shares much in

common with the revenge-as-motivated behavior approach. As previously mentioned, it
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is quite limiting to assume that a complete explanation of revenge can be achieved
when revenge is construed as the product of a carefully planned, deliberative, ‘cold’
process.
Another issue is the question of the temporal stability of revenge attitudes. The
early research on the Vengeance Scale did provide evidence demonstrating the testretest reliability of the measure (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; Holbrook, White, & Hutt,
1995; Hutt, et al., 1997). However, most studies from the attitude perspective have
assessed revenge attitudes with only a single measurement. Assuming that revenge
attitudes operate similarly to other explicitly measured attitudes, a pertinent question
that needs greater exploration is the extent to which revenge attitudes are malleable. In
other words, can revenge attitudes be changed, and if so, what are the variables that
might contribute to their modification? Unfortunately, such questions have not been
sufficiently addressed by studies utilizing the attitude perspective.
However, research from the normative perspective has shown how aspects of
social influence can contribute to the expression of revenge behaviors. An example of
this is research chronicling cultures of honor, which shows that socialization and cultural
influence play prominent roles in the expression of revenge (see Nisbett, 1993). Insofar
as normative influence can affect the expression of revenge behavior it would not be
surprising if such norms can affect people’s revenge attitudes. These questions may
come into clearer relief if we now examine the personality perspective.
Personality Approach
McCullough et al. (2001) have introduced vengefulness as an explanatory
mechanism that has further expanded the empirical scope of the literature on revenge.
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It has been argued that some people may be dispositionally oriented toward engaging in
revenge. These authors define vengefulness as an individual’s chronically accessible
beliefs and attitudes concerning the righteousness of revenge behaviors and the
individual’s endorsement of the legitimacy of revenge for solving interpersonal disputes.
Accordingly, people who are classified as vengeful are predisposed to experience
higher degrees of negative affect, have difficulty with affect regulation, and are thus
prone to use revenge as a way to regulate their experience of negative affect.
So how is vengefulness, as a personality dimension, similar to or different from
the other conceptualizations of revenge?

Vengefulness largely subsumes other

psychological explanations for revenge behavior.

For example, vengeful people

compared to those not considered vengeful are more likely to endorse norms,
motivations and attitudes that are conducive to the expression of revenge. Put another
way, the cognitive and affective architecture of vengeful individuals seems to be
chronically biased in favor of using revenge as a strategy for solving interpersonal
disputes.
In terms of personality correlates, vengefulness also has been shown to be
related to two of the Big Five super factors of personality (John, 1990; McCrae & Costa,
1987). McCullough, et al. (2001) found that thirty-percent of the variance on a measure
of vengefulness could be explained by the Neuroticism and Agreeableness factors.
They found vengefulness to be positively associated with Neuroticism and negatively
associated with Agreeableness. These authors suggested that Neuroticism, because of
its relationship to negative affect, could predispose a person to experience angry
thoughts and feelings which, given the right set of circumstances (i.e., the perception of
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an interpersonal offense); one could easily convert into vengeful thoughts, feelings and
actions. Likewise, these authors explained the negative relationship of vengefulness to
Agreeableness as indicating that those who are low in Agreeableness are more likely to
engage in conflict and are less empathetic. Since revenge may be characterized as a
goal-directed behavior, and is often born out of anger and conflict, these distinctions
seem logical.

However, it would be an oversimplification to describe vengefulness

merely as some combination of these factors. It is possible that some individuals who
display high degrees of Neuroticism and low degrees of Agreeableness are not
particularly vengeful. Neuroticism and Agreeableness may be necessary conditions for
vengefulness, but may not be themselves, sufficient properties of vengefulness. To
further understand revenge, other variables need to be accounted for.
Ruminative Thinking
Vengefulness also has been empirically linked to psychological processes other
than the Big-Five personality factors. From a cognitive perspective, vengeful individuals
appear to exhibit certain cognitive tendencies. Bar-Elli & Heyd (1986) suggested that
revenge often occurs after an individual has had some time to think about the offender
and the offense. Similarly, Buss (1961) noted that revengeful aggression often results
after the avenger has had time to think about significant events that have led up to his
decision to retaliate against an offender. The cognitive process of incessantly thinking
about the original offense, the offender, and possible vengeful actions has been termed
“rumination” (Brown, 2004; McCullough et al., 2001; Bies et al., 1997; Stuckless &
Goranson, 1992).
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Rumination has been empirically identified as the cognitive hallmark of those who
exhibit vengefulness and seek revenge (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992; Bies et al., 1997;
Baumeister, 1996; McCullough et al., 2001). It is plausible that one of the keys to
predicting whether a vengeful person will actually commit an act of revenge lies in the
extent to which he ruminates about the original offense, the offender, and more
precisely, the intrusiveness and vividness of the rumination. Nonetheless, research has
not yet broached the question of whether or not vengefulness, as an individual
difference variable, actually predicts revenge behavior in any reliable way. The depth of
analysis of vengefulness is still rooted in correlation analyses of self-report instruments.
It is assumed that prolonged and vivid rumination about an offense, if not dissipated,
can prolong the negative affectivity associated with the original offense and thus may be
construed as a proximal cause of a vengeful action.
However, rumination within the context of vengefulness is not completely
understood. Theoretical models that account for the causal link between rumination
and revenge have not been specified with any degree of precision. Some researchers
have noted that the role of rumination for the vengeful person is to keep the motivational
goals of revenge accessible (McCullough et al., 2001; Kim and Smith, 1993). However,
this construal of the role of ruminative thinking does not clearly delineate the precise
cognitive processes so as to enable us to test if this assertion is empirically supported.
Put another way – are there any similarities in the content of the ruminative thoughts of
vengeful people? If so, how might these be conceptualized? Does rumination focus on
the perceived offender or on the severity of the offence? Does the rumination entail
thoughts of injustice? A fuller understanding of these questions might be achieved
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when one considers additional thoughts that may preoccupy a person contemplating
revenge.
Impulsivity
While the links between revenge/vengefulness and rumination have been gaining
empirical support, it would be theoretically and empirically meaningful to examine the
contribution of other psychological factors that may help explain variation in revenge
and vengefulness. One such variable is impulsivity. Impulsivity has been studied in
several areas of psychology (for review see Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue,
2003). Numerous definitions have been offered to operationalize it as a psychological
construct.

For example, Eysenck and Eysenck (1977) equate impulsivity with risk

taking, lack of planning, and rapid decision making.

Patton, Stanford, and Barratt

(1995) identified three aspects of impulsivity, including spontaneous actions, inattention,
and lack of careful planning. Theory and research in the domain of human aggression
have identified the importance of the relationship between impulsivity and various kinds
of aggression (see Plutchik & van Praag, 1995). Since revenge is a form of aggression,
it is important to consider how impulsivity might relate to vengefulness and revenge.
Research from the social psychological aggression literature has demonstrated
that it is meaningful to categorize aggression into different subtypes (i.e., hostile vs.
instrumental) (Bushman & Anderson, 2001); likewise theory and research from the
clinical aggression literature have taken a similar view that aggression can be classified
into two conceptually similar subtypes. The first subtype, which is often called reactive
aggression, emphasizes strong emotionality, the loss of behavioral control and
impulsivity. On the other hand, proactive aggression shows the relative lack of emotion;
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behavioral control and premeditation (see Houston, Stanford, Villemarette-Pittman,
Conklin, & Helfritz, 2003). Reactive aggression is analogous to hostile aggression and
encompasses high levels of emotional arousal, lack of control over physiological arousal
(i.e., affect regulation) and the relative absence of behavioral control.

Conversely,

proactive aggression is analogous to instrumental aggression and is typically
accompanied by low emotional arousal (Conner, Swogger, & Houston, 2009).
Taking these ideas into account, it appears that examining the extent to which
impulsivity may factor into vengefulness and/or behavioral acts of revenge would further
advance our understanding of these important concepts. Although accumulated
evidence suggests the importance of ruminative thinking, and also the link between
vengefulness and rumination, one possibility that remains is that some acts of revenge
unfold in a more spontaneous and impulsive manner. A large literature has explored
the ways in which impulsivity can affect behavior (see Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2003). Yet, and despite that some have acknowledged the possibility of
impulsive revenge (e.g., McCullough et al., 2001), there have been no widely embraced
empirical demonstrations of this potentially important link. Moreover, existing research
does not encompass forgiveness, which impulsive tendencies could substantially
impede by biasing individuals to opt instead for revenge.
Belief in a Just World
A major contribution to social justice theory and research is Lerner’s (1980) Just
World Theory. This theory specifies that people have a critical need to believe that the
world is fair, and they are motivated to greater or lesser degrees to see the world this
way. Furthermore, Just World Theory builds on the assumption that people are highly
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vested in construing their world as a place where “people get what they deserve” and
“deserve what they get” (Lerner, 1980, p. 11). Since the central focus of just world
theorizing is how people respond to the justice or injustice they have experienced, it
may be fruitful to investigate how this construct relates to revenge. Violations of just
world expectations or belief in a just world (BJW) could lead to thoughts of revenge.
Accordingly, people may “construe events to fit this belief” (Lerner, 1980, p. 12). That
BJW influences people’s perceptions of events is perhaps the most important aspect of
BJW as it relates to the present research. In this regard, people’s level of BJW might be
useful to understanding their specific cognitive, affective and behavioral reactions to a
perceived harm.

While the relationship between BJW and revenge has not been

thoroughly explored, there is some evidence that suggests BJW could be an important
predictor of revenge thoughts. Kaiser, Vick and Major (2004) found overall total BJW
scores to be positively correlated with self-reported desire for revenge in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Additional investigations of this relationship are
warranted to further discern its broader implications. However, a more nuanced
approach

seems

necessary

considering

recent

findings

demonstrating

the

multidimensional nature of BJW.
Recent research has shown BJW to be a multidimensional construct. Lucas,
Alexander, Firestone and LeBreton (2007) have articulated the distinction between
procedural just world (PJW) and distributive just world (DJW) beliefs. Lucas et al. (2007)
have empirically distinguished between belief in the deservedness of rules, processes,
and treatment (PJW) from distributive justice criteria (DJW) (i.e., belief in the general
fairness of outcomes or allocations). Since revenge can be seen as a reaction to
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negative outcomes or to negative rules or processes, it may be useful to investigate the
relationship of PJW and DJW to cognitive and affective processes related to revenge.
Forgiveness
It is important to consider alternatives that individuals might choose when
confronted with an interpersonal offense. Not all people who experience a significant
interpersonal harm commit acts of revenge. As an alternative to revenge, individuals
may seek to overcome interpersonal conflict in more prosocial ways. One possibility is
forgiveness (e.g., Exline, Worthington, Hill & McCullough, 2003; Gable & Haidt, 2005).
Recent studies have revealed much about the influences and individual differences that
are relevant to people who choose to forgive interpersonal transgressions (for reviews
see McCullough, Root, Tabak & Witvliet, in press; Strelan & Covic, 2006). Just as in the
case of revenge, research demonstrates that rumination plays an important role in
forgiveness (McCullough, 2000; Worthington, Berry, & Parrott, 2001; Worthington &
Wade, 1999), and that rumination is often found to be negatively associated with
forgiveness (Barber, Maltby, & Macaskill, 2005; Berry, Worthington, Wade, Witvliet &
Keifer, 2005; McCullough et al., 1998; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2007). Because
intrusive and repetitive reflection about a perceived interpersonal transgression can
precede an unforgiving or vengeful response (e.g., Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen,
Vazquez, & Miller, 2005), lack of rumination is often identified as a prominent cognitive
determinant of forgiveness (though for an alternative possibility see Worthington &
Wade, 1999).

A study intending to investigate cognitive and affective aspects of

revenge should also consider forgiveness, since this alternative could be a viable option
for those who have been wronged.
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The Present Research
No matter which perspective is taken, a discernable proportion of empirical work
on revenge can be construed as focusing on cognitive and affective characteristics of
revenge seekers. Recent research has illustrated that revenge is often the end product
of prolonged rumination which occurs after one perceives an interpersonal harm. This
research has helped to illuminate our current understanding of revenge. However, at
least two major assumptions underlie this work.
The first assumption is that revenge is the product of motivated and deliberative
planning, which suggests that a discernable amount of revenge behavior is influenced
by prolonged thinking about an interpersonal harm. While it may be that a substantial
proportion of revenge is influenced by rumination, the literature on revenge could benefit
from investigations that look at the inverse of this assumption. Specifically, can revenge
occur in the relative absence of rumination? Does ‘spontaneous and impulsive’ revenge
preclude aspects of rumination that have been associated with the motivated-planning
approach to revenge? That is, can other factors such as trait impulsivity directly or
indirectly impact revenge?
Such a possibility has merit when one considers some recent research in the
clinical literature.

Investigators have found evidence in support of a dichotomous

taxonomy of aggression. Kockler, Stanford, and colleagues (2006) found that one-third
of the variance in the Impulsive/Premeditated Aggression Scale was attributable to two
distinct factors: impulsivity and premeditation. This finding seems to run parallel with
findings in support of a hostile/instrumental dichotomy, with hostile aggression sharing
aspects with impulsive aggression and instrumental aggression sharing commonalities
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with premeditated aggression.

Since revenge is considered a specific case of

aggression, revenge might be classifiable along similar lines.
While the classification of different qualitative distinctions in aggression has long
been the pursuit of researchers in the broader aggression literature (for reviews, see
Berkowitz, 1993; Baron & Richardson, 1994), such pursuits have not gone without
criticism. Bushman and Anderson (2001) have criticized the use of such dichotomous
classification schemes in lieu of a more dynamic and continuous knowledge structure
model, which purportedly does not confuse aggressive motives, and does not confound
automatic with controlled cognitive processes.

Nevertheless, in their critique of the

hostile versus instrumental dichotomy, Bushman and Anderson (2001) mention the
importance of such dichotomies as being crucial to the early development of a field’s
knowledge base.
Taking these criticisms into account, one could argue that (1) the empirical
literature on revenge is in its early stages of development and might benefit from a
similar classification scheme. Indeed, no known classification scheme applied to
revenge currently exists and (2) it may be too early in the development of this research
to jump forward to questions related to automatic vs. controlled cognitive processes as
they might relate to aspects of revenge. These points can be integrated and lead to
more specific research questions. For example, if evidence could be developed that
revenge can be either primarily instrumental/premeditated or hostile/impulsive the next
step would be to evaluate a set of questions incorporating the criticisms of Bushman &
Anderson (2001) and focus on motives as well as issues of automaticity and control. In
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the meantime, it seems worthwhile to attempt to establish empirically whether there is
heuristic value in classifying revenge into different subtypes.
A second major assumption underlying studies emphasizing the relationship
between rumination and revenge is the viewpoint that revenge is the theoretical inverse
of forgiveness. This can be seen in research confounding measures of revenge and
forgiveness. For example in the seminal paper on vengefulness, McCullough et al.
(2001) utilized the Forgiveness of Others Scale (Mauger, et al. 1992), which assesses
forgiveness attitudes. These authors viewed low scores on forgiveness as being the
equivalent of vengefulness.
This approach can be problematic.

First, there is little empirical basis for

classifying revenge as the opposite-of-forgiveness. Second, few studies investigating
revenge and/or forgiveness have simultaneously used both revenge and forgiveness
measures to evaluate the relationship between the concepts.

Therefore, it seems

important to evaluate the relationship between revenge and forgiveness using
measures designed specifically to assess these presumed opposite concepts.
The present research involves 2 studies investigating some of the issues we
have raised.
Study 1: Investigating Revenge with Self-Report Measures
Study 1 attempted to extend findings among variables implicated in revenge.
First, the assumption that revenge is the product of motivated planning was assessed
using measures of revenge and rumination. Theoretically, rumination, (a “…passive
and repetitive focus on the negative and damaging features of a stressful transaction”
Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003, p. 242) implies a time-consuming reflection
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on past events. Therefore, it was hypothesized that significant positive associations
would be found between revenge and rumination, replicating the work of McCullough, et
al. (2001). Second, the inverse hypothesis that revenge could be ‘spontaneous and
impulsive’ also was explored. Study 1 attempted to amplify findings from a pilot study by
the author. A major limitation of the pilot research was that it did not include direct
measures of rumination or forgiveness.
Three hypotheses were proposed. First, it was hypothesized that measures of
revenge would be negatively correlated with measures of forgiveness. While
theoretically this relationship appears straightforward, very few studies have
investigated the actual relationship between these presumed opposite constructs.
Second, it was anticipated that rumination (a cognitive process) would be negatively
associated with measures of forgiveness. Since rumination has been empirically linked
to revenge, it is important to determine how rumination might relate to forgiveness.
Finally, it was hypothesized that impulsivity would be positively correlated with revenge
and negatively correlated with forgiveness.
Study 2: Investigating Revenge with a Performance-Based Measure
Study 2 was an exploratory attempt to examine whether it would be possible to
relate individual differences measured on a personality test to behavioral responses.
Although self-report measures can provide some insight into the dynamics of revenge,
they also have limitations. For example, response sets may degrade response quality,
which could impact the meaning of any resulting data. The purpose of Study 2 was to
explore revenge using an alternative methodology. Specifically, Study 2 was designed
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to examine whether individual differences in revenge might relate to cognitive
responses in a performance-based situation.
In Study 2 the Emotional Stroop task (see Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Mathews, &
MacLeod, 1985; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) was used. Since the Emotional
Stroop task is a performance-based measure requiring rapid responses, threats to
measurement validity might be reduced. Additionally, the Emotional Stroop task
provides a way to measure, in real-time, the possible interplay between affective stimuli
and cognitive responses. This might make it possible to study a cognitive and affective
construct such as revenge.

Little research investigating revenge has included

performance-based measures. However, similar methods have been used to explore
related concepts such as justice beliefs (see Hafer, 2000; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). No
studies have employed the Emotional Stroop task to study intrapersonal aspects of
revenge. This is a novel use of the method.
Background: Emotional Stroop Task
The Emotional Stroop task has been used in several areas of psychology (for a
review, see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), primarily to assess the interplay
between cognitive and affective processes with particular emphasis on inhibition and
excitation. The Emotional Stroop task is derived from the original Stroop task (1935) in
which participants are required to recognize the color of printed words. The primary
dependent measure in the original Stroop task is participant’s reaction time (RT) in
recognizing the font color of printed words such as “BLUE” and “GREEN” in both
congruent and incongruent trials.

For example, in congruent trials the words are

matched with the color they describe; that is, the word “BLUE” is presented in a blue
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font color. In incongruent trials, the word “BLUE” is presented in a different font color,
such as red. Because word recognition is mostly an automatic cognitive process, color
recognition RTs are typically faster in congruent trials than they are in incongruent trials.
Put another way, an interference effect (i.e., Stroop Effect) is observed when RTs for
congruent trials are found to be significantly faster than the corresponding RTs for
incongruent trials. This interference effect is typically viewed as an indicator of failure of
participants to override or inhibit the automatic reading response via controlled cognitive
processes.
The emotional Stroop task is designed to observe differences in RTs for
emotionally laden words (Gotlib & McCann, 1984; Mathews, & MacLeod, 1985;
Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). The rationale underlying this paradigm is that
when an emotionally relevant word such as “REVENGE” is presented in color font to a
participant, the participant should demonstrate interference in color recognition when:
(1) The semantic meaning of the word has self-referential importance and/or (2) the
word is indicative of concepts or thoughts that are either chronically accessible or made
temporarily salient by a procedure such as priming. On the other hand, one would not
expect to find comparative decrements in RTs for individuals for whom the word
“REVENGE” is to a lesser degree self-referential or cognitively accessible.
In the context of the present study, it was thought that words connoting revenge
might be more accessible for participants who score high on the Vengeance Scale and
TRIM-R.

When high revenge participants are presented with a word such as

“RETALIATE,” it is possible that they might have slower RTs for recognizing the word’s
color than would low revenge participants because high revenge participants would
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experience a greater degree of interference. On the other hand, low revenge subjects
might be less likely to have revenge related thoughts and concepts accessible than high
revenge subjects and these differences could be observable as differences in relative
RTs for revenge relevant words.
It was hypothesized that individual differences in revenge scores might relate to
response patterns in the Emotional Stroop task. Compared to participants with lower
revenge scores, those possessing higher revenge scores might demonstrate slower
RTs for revenge relevant words on the Emotional Stroop task. Additionally, possible
relationships between revenge scores and RTs to forgiveness and justice words were
also examined.
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CHAPTER 2 METHOD
Study 1
Participants
Participants (N = 200, 59% female) were selected from the introductory
psychology subject pool at an urban Midwestern university. Participants were given
partial course credit for their participation. The mean age of participants was 21.83
years (SD = 5.28 years).

Participants reported their ethnicity in the following

percentages: 57.7% White, Non-Hispanic, 13.5% Arab-American, 14.3% AfricanAmerican, 3.1% Hispanic, and 11.2% as “Other.”
Materials
Revenge. The Vengeance Scale (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992) consists of 20
items using 7-point Likert scales (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) (see Appendix
A). The Vengeance Scale was devised to measure individual differences in attitudes
toward revenge. Sample items are: “It is important for me to get back at people who
have hurt me” and “People who insist on getting revenge are disgusting.” The measure
is internally consistent (α = .92), possesses good test-retest reliability (r = .90) and is
uncontaminated by social desirability response biases (Stuckless & Goranson, 1992).
The

Transgression

Related

Interpersonal

Motivations

Inventory

(TRIM)

(McCullough, et al., 1998) has a total of 12 Likert-type items (1=strongly disagree,
5=strongly agree) factor analytically divided into two distinct sub-scales; Avoidance (A)
(7 items) and Revenge (R) (5 items) (see Appendix B). Sample items are: “I withdraw
from him/her” (A) and “I’m going to get even” (R). McCullough et al. (1998) report
Cronbach alphas of .86 and .90 for Avoidance and Revenge subscales respectively as
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well as test-retest values ranging from r=.86 (3-weeks) to r =.64 (9-weeks) for
Avoidance and r=.79 (3-weeks) to r = .65 (9-weeks) for Revenge. It is important to note
that McCullough et al. (2001) have interpreted a low revenge score on the TRIM as a
measure of forgiveness.
Rumination.

The Impact of Event Scale (IES) (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez,

1979) is a 15-item self-report measure which assesses ruminative tendencies related to
two things, (1) the intrusiveness and (2) the avoidance of distressing life events (see
Appendix C). The IES is presented in a Likert-type format (“1” representing “not at all”
and “7” representing “often.”) Sample items include: “Pictures about it popped into my
mind” (Intrusion) and “I tried not to think about it.” (Avoidance). The IES is a widely used
measure possessing acceptable psychometric properties. Corcoran and Fisher (1994)
found the IES to possess alphas ranging from .79 to .92. Likewise, the IES has been
found to possess adequate test-retest reliabilities ranging from .79 to .87 (Horowitz, et
al., 1979). Indicators of the scale’s validity also have been observed. For example, the
IES has been shown to predict significant changes in coping patterns among clinical
samples experiencing post-traumatic stress symptoms (see Corcoran & Fisher, 1994;
Weiss & Marmar, 1997).
Impulsivity. The Eysenck I.7 Impulsiveness subscale (Eysenck, et al., 1985) is a
19-item self-report questionnaire presented in a yes/no format (see Appendix D).
Representative items are: “Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?” and
“Before making up your mind, do you consider all the advantages and disadvantages?”
Eysenck, et al. (1985) report alphas greater than .80 as well as a one-year test-retest
reliability of r = .76. Likewise, the I.7 has been shown to be significantly positively
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correlated with measures of psychoticism and neuroticism, with correlations ranging
from .34 to .44.
Forgiveness. The Tendency to Forgive Scale (TTF) and the Attitudes Toward
Forgiveness Scale (ATF) (Brown, 2003) are brief self-report measures (see Appendices
E & F).

The TTF consists of four Likert-type items emphasizing respondents’

endorsement of forgiveness relevant behaviors (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
A sample item from the TTF: “I tend to get over it quickly when someone hurts my
feelings.” The ATF consists of six Likert-type items designed to tap into respondents
endorsement of forgiveness relevant attitudes (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
For example, “I believe that forgiveness is a moral virtue.”

The TTF is internally

consistent (α = .82) possesses good test-retest reliability (r = .71) and is only
moderately correlated with social desirability response biases (r =.25).

The ATF

demonstrates moderate internal consistency reliability (α = .61). It has been found to be
significantly negatively correlated with the Vengeance Scale (r = -.45) (Brown, 2003).
Belief in a Just World. The original Procedural and Distributive Just World Beliefs
scale (Lucas, et al., 2007) is an eight-item Likert-type measure (1=strongly disagree,
7=strongly agree) with four items tapping procedural just world beliefs (PJW), i.e., the
extent to which individuals believe that people in general get what they deserve vis-à-vis
rules, processes and treatment (see Appendix G). For example, “People usually use fair
procedures in dealing with others.” Although 10 items were administered to participants,
only the 8 refined items from (Lucas, et al., 2007) were scored in the present research.
Appendix G indicates the items that were not scored. The 4-item distributive just world
beliefs (DJW) subscale emphasizes the extent to which individuals endorse items
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pertaining to the deservingness of outcomes or allocations for people in general (e.g.
‘people usually receive outcomes that they deserve’). Each subscale has been shown to
be factor-analytically distinct and possesses alphas ranging from.89 to .92 (PJW) and .88
to .92 (DJW) (Lucas, et al., 2007).
Procedure
Participants were greeted by the investigator and told that this was a study of
opinions about everyday life experiences. The number of participants in each session
ranged from 10 to 20. After participants’ written consent was obtained, the experimenter
distributed packets containing the measures.

The measures used in Study 1 were

presented in two orders. This was done as an attempt to reduce the influence of earlier
measures on later measures. The first order (N = 107) was as follows: Vengeance Scale
(Vengeance), I.7 Impulsivity (Impulsivity), Impact of Event Scale (Rumination), Attitudes
Toward Forgiveness (ATF), Tendency to Forgive (TTF), PJW, DJW, and TRIM. Order 2 (N
= 93) simply reversed Order 1, beginning with the TRIM, DJW, PJW, etc.

The

experimenter explained that participants’ responses would remain anonymous and that
they should carefully read and consider all the items. Participants were given fifty minutes
to complete the measures.

When participants were finished, they were thanked and

debriefed as to the specific nature of the study.
Study 2
Participants
In the first session of Study 2, participants (N = 145, 60.7% female) were
volunteers from the introductory psychology subject pool at a mid-sized Midwestern
university. Participants received partial course credit for their participation. The mean
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age of participants was 24.62 years (SD = 8.51 years). Participants reported their
ethnicity in the following percentages: 55.2% White, Non-Hispanic, 15.2% ArabAmerican, 14.5% African-American, 4.8% Hispanic, and 10.4% as “Other.”
In the second session of Study 2, there were 100 participants (67.4% female)
who had previously completed Part 1 of Study 2 and received partial credit for that
participation. All participants, with the exception of 1 male (colorblindness) reported
having normal color vision. This participant was excluded from the emotional Stroop
portion of the study, but was given full-credit for his participation. The mean time interval
between session 1 and session 2 was 14 days. The range between sessions was from
2 to 30 days. The mean age of these 100 participants was 24.81 years (SD = 8.35
years). Study 2 participants reported ethnicity was 52.8% White, Non-Hispanic, 20.2%
Arab-American, 15.7% African-American, 3.4% Hispanic, and 7.8% as “Other.”
Measures
The self-report measures used in session 1 of Study 2 were identical to the
measures used in Study 1. Only the order of presentation of the 6 measures varied
from Study 1. In Study 2, the following order of presentation was used: PJW, DJW,
Vengeance Scale, I.7 Impulsivity, IES (Rumination), ATF, TRIM, and TTF.
Selection of Word Lists for the Emotional Stroop Task
Four lists of 4 words each (Total = 16 words) were generated using the following
categories: (1) Revenge (2) Forgiveness (3) Justice and (4) Neutral (see Appendix H).
These words were selected from a recent edition of Webster’s dictionary and thesaurus
(1999). Following the recommendations of Larsen, Mercer, & Balota (2006), ANOVAs
were performed to ensure that the word lists were equivalent in their lexical features,
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such as frequency of use, average word length and orthographic neighborhood, which
is the number of different words into which a particular word can be transformed by
modifying one letter in the word without changing position of the other letters (Coltheart,
Davelarr, Jonasson, & Besner, 1977).

Furthermore, using the norms provided at

http://elexicon.wustl.edu, the word lists were matched according to average reaction
times, naming latencies and overall accuracy.

From these analyses, no significant

differences were found on the indices of lexical features, reaction times, naming
latencies or overall accuracy. This analysis is important because the measurement
model of the Emotional Stroop task requires a comparison of average word color
recognition latencies to a control list of neutral words. If the word lists are not equivalent
in their lexical characteristics, any resulting differences (e.g., slow down in color
recognition latencies) between the experimental and control lists could not be attributed
to the content of the word lists, but rather, the confounding aspects of differences in
lexical features.
Procedure
Study 2 consisted of two sessions. In the first session, participants were given
similar instructions as were given to participants in Study 1. Participants were greeted
by the investigator and told that this was a study of opinions about everyday life
experiences. Additionally, participants were informed that to receive full credit for their
participation they would have to attend a subsequent lab session. Participants were
given an index card upon which their self-chosen participant identification number was
written.

Participants were asked to sign-up for a study entitled “Word Recognition
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Study” and to bring their participant identification cards with them to the subsequent
session.
The number of participants in each group tested in the first session ranged from 8
to 18. After participants’ consent was obtained, the experimenter distributed packets
containing the measures. The experimenter explained that participants’ responses would
remain anonymous and that they should carefully read and consider all the items.
Participants were given a total of fifty minutes to complete the measures. The same
measures used in Study 1 were used for Study 2. While Study 1 used two orders of
presentation for the self-report measures, Study 2 used only one order of presentation,
which itself differed from the two orders used in Study 1. A third order was chosen for
Study 2 because published research using the DJW and PJW measures had always
presented these measures before other measures. Additionally, due to the low correlation
values of DJW and PJW with other measures in Study 1, it was important to assess
whether a different order of presentation might have influenced the correlation coefficients
of DJW and PJW with other measures. For Study 2, the order of presentation was as
follows: PJW, DJW, Vengeance Scale, I.7 Impulsivity, IES, ATF, TRIM, and TTF.
In the second session, which took place at various time intervals after the first
session (M = 14 days; range = 2 – 30 days) individual participants completed a
computerized Emotional Stroop task.

The stimulus materials were presented using

Inquisit Millisecond software version 3.0 (2008). In the second session, participants
were tested individually. When participants arrived at the laboratory they were greeted
by an experimenter and directed to a computer terminal. The experimenter then
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provided oral instructions covering the procedures of the experiment, which were also
provided in written form on computer monitors. The oral and written instructions stated:
This experiment is called the Stroop task. You will be shown
a series of words that are written in four different colors:
Blue, Green, Red and Yellow. Your task is to identify the
font color of each word by reading the font color of the word
into the microphone. Make sure that you respond as fast as
you can; as soon as you know the answer. You will have a
total of five seconds to respond to each word, after which
you will be presented with the next word.
After the participants received the initial instructions, they were presented with an
initial block of practice trials. The purpose of the practice trials was to acquaint them
with example words and font colors and to become familiar with the configuration of the
computer monitor and the microphone.

Participants were not told that their initial

responses were practice trials. The practice block consisted of 16 trials using four
different color/word combinations.

The practice block was a shorter version of the

original Stroop (1935) task. Four color words: BLUE, GREEN, RED and YELLOW were
presented to participants in the middle of a white background on the individual’s 16-inch
computer monitor using a 24-point Arial font. Each color word was presented randomly
in its congruent color font and cycled through each of the other incongruent font colors.
For example, the word “BLUE” was presented in blue as well as in green, red and
yellow fonts. Participants were instructed to record their responses to the various font
colors by reading the color of the words that were presented. If the participant did not
respond with the correct response, a “!” was presented and an “incorrect response”
code was automatically written to the data file. The trials proceeded consecutively until
each participant was randomly presented with the 16 word/color combinations.
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After the practice block was complete, participants received instructions
indicating that they would be presented with another task. Those instructions stated
that the participant would be completing a similar task; however, they would be viewing
different kinds of words.
instruction screen.

An example word “SAILBOAT” was presented on the

The instructions also directed participants to consult the

experimenter if they had any questions.

After the participants finished with the

instructions, they were presented with the critical trials. The critical trials consisted of
the Emotional Stroop task in which participants are randomly presented with words from
a list of 16 total words from the following categories: revenge, forgiveness, justice and
neutral (4 words per category). Each word was randomly cycled through each of four
font colors: blue, green, red and yellow. Each word was presented a total of four times
each (once in each font color). Participants completed a total of 64 critical trials. The
response procedures in the critical trials were identical to those used in the practice
block, wherein participants were asked to verbally state the font colors of the presented
words. When participants were finished, they were thanked and debriefed as to the
specific goals of the study.
To determine whether the procedure used in Study 2 was sufficient to produce
viable effects, the data from the first 20 participants were inspected. This inspection
indicated that additional experimental manipulations were not necessary at that point in
the study. That is, correlations between the self-report and RT measures were mostly
in the anticipated directions.
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CHAPTER 3 RESULTS
Overview of Statistical Analyses
The primary purpose of Study 1 was to examine the extent to which individual
differences in impulsivity and rumination would predict scores on measures of revenge
and forgiveness. It was hypothesized that a measure of rumination would be
significantly positively correlated with measures of vengeance and revenge. Likewise, it
was hypothesized that a measure of impulsivity would be significantly positively
associated with measures of vengeance and revenge. Another goal of Study 1 was to
determine the extent to which impulsivity and rumination would predict measures of
forgiveness.
To determine the nature of the hypothesized relationships, data analysis followed
a three-step framework.

First, data screening was performed to ensure statistical

assumptions associated with structural equation modeling (SEM) were not violated.
Second, bivariate relationships among all measures were examined. Finally, analyses
using SEM were conducted to test the potential for more complex relationships among a
number of theoretically related variables. All statistical tests used two-tailed tests of
significance, which as compared to directional hypothesis tests, provides more
conservative p-values, lowering the possibility of Type I errors.
Data Selection and Screening
In Study 1, two orders of presentation were used. The first order (N = 107) was
as follows: Vengeance Scale (Vengeance), I.7 Impulsivity (Impulsivity), Impact of Event
Scale (Rumination), Attitudes Toward Forgiveness (ATF), Tendency to Forgive (TTF),
PJW, DJW, and TRIM. Order 2 (N = 93) simply reversed Order 1, beginning with the
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TRIM, DJW, etc. Study 2 added another 145 participants. The order of presentation in
session 1 of Study 2 was as follows: PJW, DJW, Vengeance Scale, I.7 Impulsivity, IES
(Rumination), ATF, TRIM and TTF. Since the same self-report measures were used in
both Study 1 and Study 2, the samples from both studies were merged for the main
data analyses examining relationships among the individual difference measures. This
yielded a total sample of 345 (Study 1, order 1 = 107, Study 1, order 2 = 93, Study 2,
session 1 = 145). Once the samples were combined, the data were screened following
the recommendations of Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), to verify that necessary statistical
assumptions were met. The data were checked for missing data, normality and linearity,
outliers, multicollinearity, singularity and adequacy of covariances. These analyses
revealed no major issues that need to be considered within the context of the main
analyses.
Analysis of Bivariate Relationships
To evaluate the potential impact of order effects on the bivariate relationships
separate correlation matrices using Pearson’s r were calculated for each of the two
orders used in Study 1 (see Tables 1 & 2).

Comparisons between the correlation

matrices consisted of an examination of the magnitude, direction and statistical
significance of each bivariate relationship. One bivariate relationship (out of a total of 36
possible) emerged as potentially problematic. When comparing the Impulsivity-PJW
correlation, a difference was observed. In order 1, r = .06, p = ns. In order 2, r = -.29, p
< .001. Fisher’s r to z transformation demonstrated that the relationships were
significantly different for order 1 and order 2 (z = 2.49, p < .05). After the correlation
matrices from orders 1 and 2 were examined, the samples were combined. Table 3

35
shows that the different orders had a minimal impact on the resulting combined
correlation matrix.

The only issue was the above mentioned relationship between

Impulsivity and PJW.
Table 4 presents the bivariate relationships for the individual differences
measures in Study 2. The comparison of Tables 3 (Study 1) and 4 (Study 2) shows
differences in 4 correlation coefficients (Impulsivity-ATF, Impulsivity-TTF, ImpulsivityAvoidance, and TTF-PJW) out of 36, between Studies 1 and 2, but the direction of the
rs is the same in both studies.
Table 5 presents the results for the combined samples from Studies 1 and 2. A
number of meaningful bivariate associations emerge for the total combined samples of
Study 1 plus Study 2 (N = 345). As hypothesized, negative associations were observed
between the revenge and forgiveness measures. The Vengeance Scale correlated with
ATF in the predicted direction (r = -.66, p < .001). Likewise, the Vengeance Scale
correlated with TTF (r = -.51, p < .001). Similar findings were observed when TRIMRevenge was correlated with ATF (r = -.46, p < .001) and TTF (r = -.42, p < .001). It also
was hypothesized that a measure of rumination would be negatively correlated with
measures of forgiveness. This hypothesis received partial support. While the IES was
significantly related to TTF (r = -.29, p < .001), the hypothesized relationship between
the IES and ATF was not significant (r = -.06, p = ns.). Additionally, the IES was
positively associated with TRIM-Revenge (r = .23, p < .001).
Finally, it was hypothesized that Impulsivity would be positively associated with
measures of revenge. Support was observed for the Vengeance Scale (r = .34, p <
.001) and TRIM-Revenge (r = .33, p < .001). Significant negative relationships were
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observed between Impulsivity and Forgiveness: ATF r = -.25, p < .001 and TTF r = -.21,
p < .001.
While scrutiny of the bivariate associations reveals support for a number of
hypothesized relationships, it is difficult to discern more complex relationships without
the aid of more complex statistical analysis. Therefore, structural equation modeling
(SEM) analyses were conducted. The combined data from the two studies was used
(greater sample size provides increased statistical power to detect significant
relationships among the variables included in the model).
Structural Equation Modeling
Using the combined data from Studies 1 and 2 (N = 345), manifest structural
equation modeling was used to examine relationships among Impulsivity, Rumination,
Vengeance, Revenge, Forgiveness and Avoidance (see Table 6).

Because of the

minimal effects of DJW and PJW observed in the correlation matrices (no significant
relationships in the combined sample), DJW and PJW were not included in the SEM
analyses. Analyses were conducted using LISREL 8.30 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999) and
maximum likelihood estimation.

The fit of all theoretical models was evaluated using

several widely reported fit indices.

These included the nonnormed (NNFI) fit index

(Bentler & Bonett, 1980), the comparative fit index (CFI) (Bentler, 1990), the
standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) (Hu & Bentler, 1999; McDonald & Ho,
2002), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMESA) (Browne & Cudeck,
1993). Values of .90 or higher indicate good overall fit for the NNFI and CFI, while
values near or below .05 are considered acceptable for the SRMR. Additionally, values
greater than .10 are considered unacceptable for RMESA. To determine the best fitting
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but most parsimonious model of relationships, several alternative structural models
were identified and compared. All model comparisons utilized a chi-square test, in
which significant increases or decreases in chi-square indicated a meaningful change in
model fit with the addition or subtraction of various specified paths.
The analysis began with an “all paths model,” in which relationships among all
measures were free to vary. In the second step of the analysis, the structural path from
impulsivity to vengeance was removed to determine the possibility of a direct
relationship between these measures. In the third step of the analysis, the structural
path from rumination to vengeance was removed to evaluate the potential direct
relationship between these measures. In the next step of the analysis, the direct effect
of impulsivity on forgiveness, revenge and avoidance was removed to determine the
possibility of a mediating effect of vengeance on these measures. Finally, the direct
effect of rumination on vengeance, forgiveness, revenge and avoidance was removed
to determine whether a direct effect of rumination on these measures was empirically
supported.
Identifying the Appropriate Structural Model
Fit statistics are presented in Table 6. After the all paths model was specified,
the second step of the analysis was conducted. This step of the analysis indicated that
when the structural path from impulsivity to vengeance was removed the model
demonstrated significantly lower fit when compared to the all paths model, χ2 (1, N =
345) = 46.57, p < .001 (NNFI = .48, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .36, SRMR = .10) confirming a
hypothesized direct relationship between impulsivity and vengeance. In the third step of
the analysis, the relationship between rumination and vengeance was assessed to
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determine the existence of a direct relationship between these measures. When the
path from rumination to vengeance was removed, overall model fit did not improve (χ2
(1, N = 345) = 1.34, p = ns, NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .02),
indicating that the hypothesized direct relationship between rumination and vengeance
was not supported.
Next, direct paths from impulsivity to revenge, forgiveness and avoidance were
removed from the all paths model. This step of the analysis likewise revealed nonsignificant findings, χ2 (4, N = 345) = 4.56, p = ns (NNFI = .99, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02,
SRMR = .02), indicating that the direct paths from impulsivity to revenge, forgiveness
and avoidance did not significantly increase model fit and therefore direct links between
impulsivity and revenge, impulsivity and forgiveness, as well as impulsivity and
avoidance were not confirmed. Finally, direct paths from rumination to vengeance,
revenge, forgiveness and avoidance were removed. This revealed significant findings,
χ2 (7, N = 345) = 71.73, p < .001 (NNFI = .68, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .16, SRMR = .11),
establishing support for the hypothesized direct relationships between rumination with
forgiveness, rumination and revenge.
Overall results of this analysis revealed a final model in which impulsivity
demonstrated fully mediated effects on forgiveness, revenge and avoidance through
vengefulness, with the absence of direct effects of impulsivity on these measures.
Rumination demonstrated the expected direct effects on forgiveness, revenge and
avoidance. Unlike the findings for impulsivity, these effects were not at all mediated by
vengeance. In other words, impulsivity is linked to forgiveness/revenge only through the
vengeance pathway, and these relationships hold even after controlling for known
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associations between rumination and forgiveness and revenge.

Rumination is only

linked to forgiveness and revenge outside of the vengefulness pathway.
Path Estimates of Final Structural Model
Figure 1 provides standardized path estimates obtained for the final structural
model. As hypothesized, rumination and impulsivity were positively related (r = .20, p <
.001). Likewise, vengeance and impulsivity share a direct relationship (β =.43, p <
.001), confirming the hypothesized link between vengeance and impulsivity. The
relationship between vengeance and revenge was strong (β =.86, p < .001), as was the
negative relationship between vengeance and forgiveness (β = -.56, p < .001). As
hypothesized, rumination was significantly positively related to revenge (β =.25, p <
.001).

Most importantly, the effects of impulsivity and rumination on vengeance,

revenge, forgiveness and avoidance showed different paths. As may be seen in Figure
1, the relationship between impulsivity and forgiveness, revenge and avoidance was
fully mediated by vengeance. On the other hand, the effect of rumination on these
measures was one that was direct and unmediated by vengeance.
Impulsivity Indirect Effects
To further explore relationships between Revenge, Forgiveness, Avoidance and
their antecedents, the indirect effects for impulsivity were calculated. As seen in Table
7, impulsivity showed indirect effects on forgiveness (β = -.24, p < .001), revenge (β =
.37, p < .001) and avoidance (β = .07, p < .001). While rumination and impulsivity
overall were significant predictors of revenge, forgiveness and avoidance, the effect of
rumination was exclusively direct, as all of the direct paths from rumination to revenge,
forgiveness and avoidance were significant.
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Statistical Analyses for Study 2
A major purpose of Study 2 was to explore whether individual differences in
measures of revenge (Vengeance Scale and TRIM-R), forgiveness (ATF and TTF),
impulsivity (I.7) and rumination (Rumination-Intrusion subscale) would predict reaction
time (RT) scores on an emotional Stroop task.
Data Screening
One-hundred people participated in the reaction time experiment. All data were
inspected to determine whether they possessed the necessary characteristics for
statistical tests associated with the general linear model (GLM).

First, descriptive

statistics were calculated for the self-report measures to determine if any statistical
assumptions, such as linearity, homoscedasticity and normality were violated.

No

violations of statistical assumptions were observed in the self-report data. Second, the
RT data from the emotional Stroop task were carefully scrutinized for the existence of
errors (i.e., inaccurate responding) and outliers (i.e., very slow RTs). Frequency counts,
histograms and z-scores were calculated for each word presented in the emotional
Stroop task.

Statistical criteria were established to aid this process.

Specifically,

participants who had error rates in excess of 5% of the critical trials were excluded from
the data set.

Additionally, participants who had a substantial number (> 10%) of

skewed RTs (i.e., z > 3.30) for the words presented in the emotional Stroop task were
likewise excluded from subsequent analyses. As a result, a total of 11 participants were
excluded from the main analyses, leaving the data from 89 participants to be analyzed
in Study 2.
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After the data for Study 2 were scrutinized for statistical assumptions, the
remaining data (N = 89) were once again checked for normality. Frequency counts,
histograms and z scores were again inspected to ensure none of the remaining data
were skewed. While the exclusion of 11 participants had the effect of eliminating cases
with the greatest amount of skewed responses, the z scores of the resulting data
indicated about 12% of the remaining 89 participants had at least one skewed RT
among their responses to the 128 word/color combinations. To correct the remaining
skewed distributions, the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) were
employed. The deviance of the remaining outlying variables was reduced by assigning
the outlying cases raw scores which were a unit larger than the next greatest extreme
score within each skewed distribution. For example, if a participant’s RT to a word such
as “FAIRNESS” had an outlying score of 1192 ms, with a corresponding z score of 3.45,
and the next greatest RT for the variable was 1066 ms, with a z score of 2.95, the
outlying variable’s raw score was assigned a value of 1067 ms.

According to

Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) the effect of this procedure “… is to change the scores(s)
on the variables(s) for the outlying case(s) so that they are deviant, but not as deviant
as they were” (p. 71).
Multiple Regression Analyses
The data were further screened to verify that necessary statistical assumptions
for multiple regression were met. These analyses revealed only minor issues to be
considered within the context of the main analyses.

First, the ratio of cases to

predictors was considered. Given that that the main analyses used six predictors and
the total N for the sample was 89, the ratio of cases to predictors was deemed
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satisfactory.

Next, analyses were performed to determine potential problems

associated with the distributions of residuals. No significant violations of normality,
linearity or homoscedasticity were found in the regression models. Next, potential
issues associated with multicollinearity and singularity was examined.

None of the

tolerance statistics approached zero, indicating that no significant problems of
multicollinearity or singularity were observed.
Four separate multiple regression models were calculated to test hypotheses
concerning potential relationships among the selected self-report measures and the RT
data. Statistical criteria were used to determine the influence of each of the self-report
measures on aggregated RTs for each of the 4 word categories (i.e., Revenge,
Forgiveness, Justice and Neutral words). Due to the lack of strong theoretical criteria
for the model entry order of the predictors, the statistical criteria used to determine the
specific order of entry for each of the predictors conformed to approaches popular when
a theoretical order of entry is not specified (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Specifically,
predictors were included in the final models using standard multiple regression, which
uses a simultaneous entry approach when including predictors into the models.
Each of the four multiple regression analyses used the revenge measures
(Vengeance Scale and TRIM-Revenge), forgiveness measures (ATF and TTF) the I.7
Impulsivity measure and the Rumination-Intrusion subscale of the IES as predictors.
This yielded an acceptable N to k ratio for multiple regression, which was approximately
15:1 (see Green, 1991; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For each of the regression models,
RTs to the emotional and neutral word categories were used as DVs. Therefore, the first
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regression analysis used the aggregated RTs to the revenge words, followed by
forgiveness, justice, and neutral words.
The results of the multiple regression analyses are presented in Table 8.
Overall, the multiple regression analyses provided partial support for the self-report
revenge and forgiveness measures as significant predictors of RT. The Vengeance
Scale was a significant predictor of RT for the aggregated Revenge words list (β = .38,
p < .05), indicating a possible Stroop interference relationship.

Likewise, the

Vengeance Scale also was a significant predictor of RT for the Forgiveness words list (β
= .37, p < .05). For the Justice words list, the Vengeance Scale was a marginally
significant predictor (β = .30, p < .10).

The Vengeance Scale failed to reach

significance for the Neutral words list (β = .22, p < ns).
Further analysis indicated that Rumination-Intrusion yielded slower RT scores for
each one of the four word lists, indicating the possibility of a generalized interference
effect associated with scores on this measure.
To elaborate on the findings of the multiple regression analyses, it is informative
to consider the predicted values of the RTs for each significant beta in selected
regression models.

Because the findings for the revenge and forgiveness words

multiple regression analyses were the most theoretically meaningful these models were
further analyzed. In the first multiple regression analysis, RTs of the revenge words
were significantly predicted by Vengeance Scale scores, as well as scores from the
Rumination-Intrusion subscale of the IES. To more fully understand the implications of
this multiple regression model, it is important to consider the predicted RT scores for the
revenge words for values for 1 SD above and below the mean of each predictor.
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Table 9 presents the means and standard deviations of the predictors included in
each regression model. In the regression model predicting RTs to revenge words, the
following regression equation was derived:
Revenge words RT: Y’ = 325.04 + 1.67 (Vengeance Scale) -1.95 (TRIM-R) + 3.68 (ATF)
+.51 (TTF) - 1.48 (Impulsivity) + 3.09 (Rumination-Intrusion).
While using the means for the non-significant predictors, the value of 77.94 (+1
SD) was entered into the model for the Vengeance Scale. This yielded a predicted
value of RT for revenge words = 650.26 ms. Likewise, entering the value of 41.58 (-1
SD) into the model yielded a predicted value of RT for revenge words = 589.54 ms.
Therefore, when comparing the inclusion of values 1 SD above and below the mean of
the Vengeance Scale, greater Vengeance Scale scores predict slower RTs for the
revenge words list. Conversely, lower Vengeance Scale scores predict faster RTs for
the same words.
Rumination-Intrusion also was a significant predictor of revenge word RTs. To
determine the predicted RT values for the revenge words lists, a similar procedure was
used using values for 1 SD above and below the mean of Rumination-Intrusion. Using
the means of all the remaining predictors, the value of 38.54 (+1 SD) yielded a predicted
value of RT for revenge words = 643.60 ms. Additionally, entering the value of 23.20 (1 SD) into the model yielded a predicted value of RT for revenge words = 595.90 ms.
Therefore, when comparing the inclusion of values 1 SD above and below the mean of
Rumination-Intrusion, greater Rumination-Intrusion scores predict slower RTs for the
revenge words list; lower Rumination-Intrusion scores predict faster RTs for the same
words.
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In the second multiple regression analysis, RTs of the forgiveness words were
significantly predicted by Vengeance Scale scores, as well as scores from the
Rumination-Intrusion subscale of the IES.
A similar regression equation was derived for the forgiveness words list:
Forgiveness words RT: Y’ = 343.01 + 1.62 (Vengeance Scale) -1.92 (TRIM-R) + 2.76
(ATF) +.78 (TTF) + 1.32 (Impulsivity) + 2.59 (Rumination-Intrusion).
While using the means for the non-significant predictors, the value of 77.94 (+1
SD) was entered into the model for the Vengeance Scale. This yielded a predicted
value of RT for forgiveness words = 637.09 ms. Likewise, entering the value of 41.58 (1 SD) into the model yielded a predicted value of RT for forgiveness words = 578.19
ms. Therefore, when comparing the inclusion of values 1 SD above and below the
mean of the Vengeance Scale, greater Vengeance Scale scores predict slower RTs for
the forgiveness words list. Conversely, lower Vengeance Scale scores predict faster
RTs for the same words.
Rumination-Intrusion also was a significant predictor of forgiveness words RTs.
To determine the predicted RT values for the forgiveness words lists, a similar
procedure was used using values for 1 SD above and below the mean of RuminationIntrusion. Using the means of all the remaining predictors, the value of 38.54 (+1 SD)
yielded a predicted value of RT for forgiveness words = 627.51 ms.

Additionally,

entering the value of 23.20 (-1 SD) into the model yielded a predicted value of RT for
forgiveness words = 587.78 ms. Therefore, when comparing the inclusion of values 1
SD above and below the mean of Rumination-Intrusion, greater Rumination-Intrusion
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scores predict slower RTs for the forgiveness words list; lower Rumination-Intrusion
scores predict faster RTs for the same words.
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CHAPTER 4 DISCUSSION
Although empirical research on the psychology of revenge is increasing, most of
the research on people’s psychological reactions to interpersonal offences has
emphasized the psychological variables and processes related to forgiveness. Although
forgiveness is a potential option for those who have been wronged, the disproportionate
research emphasis on forgiveness seems to have directed investigators’ attention away
from considering other behavioral alternatives and the psychological variables and
processes related to these alternatives. The present research focused on one of these
alternatives, revenge, and investigated some of the psychological aspects of revenge.
While not conclusive, the results from this research illustrate some important
relationships among variables that have been implicated in previous discussions of the
topic.

This research also provided some hypotheses that have not been widely

discussed in past research.
The present research was based on an individual differences perspective. This
perspective emphasizes that different individuals possess varying degrees of particular
psychological variables. For example, some people may be more vengeful than others,
and likewise, some people may be more forgiving than others.

The individual

differences approach to the study of psychological phenomena is well-established (see
Scott, Osgood, & Peterson, 1979; Major & Deaux, 1982; Ackerman & Humphreys,
1990). It is a common approach in many areas of psychological inquiry, including social
psychology.
Self-report instruments were used to measure individual differences.

These

measures were chosen based on their relevance to past research findings as well as for
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theoretical reasons.

All of the measures had been developed and used by other

investigators. The measures were employed in the present research to capture
important individual differences in revenge attitudes and motivations, forgiveness
attitudes and behavioral intentions, individual differences in impulsivity and rumination,
and belief in a just world.
It was hypothesized that measures of revenge would be positively associated
with a measure of impulsivity.

Bivariate associations indicated significant positive

relationships between revenge and impulsivity.

While the finding that revenge was

significantly associated with impulsivity does shed light on this relationship, this does
not imply that the role of rumination is unimportant. As anticipated, rumination also was
positively associated with measures of revenge. This latter finding largely replicates
past research and indicates that individuals more likely to endorse revenge attitudes,
motivations and behaviors appear to have intrusive thoughts which are difficult for them
to consciously suppress.

Although rumination and impulsivity were associated with

measures of revenge, these findings should be interpreted cautiously. First, rumination
and impulsivity were positively correlated.

While on the surface the bivariate

relationships among revenge, impulsivity and rumination seem unambiguous, the
findings from the SEM analysis suggest that these relationships are more complex.
Conceptually, rumination and impulsivity appear to be very different concepts.
Rumination emphasizes a repetitive cognitive process that includes a level of
awareness of one’s thoughts. The measure of rumination used in the present research
had been developed to provide indicators of two aspects of this awareness: 1) intrusion:
unwanted thoughts related to a negative experience a person has endured and 2)
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suppression; involves attempts by a person to consciously avoid intrusive thoughts. On
the other hand, impulsivity can be viewed in a manner that minimizes the role of
controlled thinking, such as ‘acting without thinking.’ Nonetheless, in the present
research rumination and impulsivity were positively associated, indicating that these
variables shared a significant amount of variation. There may be several reasons why
these variables were found to be positively related.
While there is little research examining the relationship between impulsivity and
rumination, the findings presented here indicate that these variables are moderately
correlated.

As is the case with any correlational finding, the relationship between

impulsivity and rumination might be explained in a number of ways. One possibility, not
directly measured in the present research, involves negative affect. Some past studies
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Thomsen, 2006) have linked rumination with
negative affect and have shown that negative affect regulation may be difficult for highly
vengeful people (McCullough et al, 2001).

Since negative affect was not directly

assessed in this research, this is merely speculative. However, it is plausible that the
measures of impulsivity and rumination used in this research had shared variance
because of participants’ level of negative affect. Future research should explore this
possibility, since negative affectivity is a prominent psychological characteristic of
vengeful people (McCullough et al., 2001; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992).
It is important to note another possible explanation for the rumination-impulsivity
relationship. In Study 1, the measures were presented in two orders. This approach
was primarily used to reduce the effect that order of presentation could have on
response patterns to the various measures. In order 1, the I.7 Impulsivity measure was
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presented immediately before the IES Rumination measure. In order 2, the order of
presentation was reversed, with rumination immediately preceding impulsivity. In the
first session of Study 2, a third order of presentation was used.

This order also

presented the impulsivity and rumination measures back-to-back, with impulsivity
immediately preceding rumination. Since the main correlational results reported used
the combined data from both studies 1 and 2, it was anticipated that any existing order
effects would be minimized.

However, a potential consequence of arranging the

impulsivity and rumination measures in such close proximity could have resulted in a
methodologically related artifact.

Although there is no direct evidence that this

influenced the findings, it is a possibility that must be considered.
It also was hypothesized that measures of revenge would be negatively
associated with measures of forgiveness. This hypothesis was empirically supported,
as shown by the results of both the correlational and SEM analysis. Although these
findings may seem obvious to a lay observer, they are important since very few studies
have specifically examined empirical relationships between revenge and forgiveness.
Many authors have assumed that revenge and forgiveness are opposite sides of a
behavioral continuum that a person could choose when confronted with a significant
interpersonal offense. Although the data in the present research cannot rule out the
possibility that revenge and forgiveness are the opposite poles of a behavioral spectrum
ranging from the antisocial to the prosocial, the findings presented here are not
conclusive enough to make this case. One possibility to consider is whether revenge
and forgiveness are multidimensional constructs.

While the measures used in the

present research assume these variables are unidimensional, future research should
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focus on developing methods and measures to more fully determine these constructs’
psychometric properties.
Observing bivariate relationships in isolation cannot fully elucidate the ‘big
picture’ presented when one considers the results of the SEM analysis.

The SEM

findings suggest a more complex picture. A specific advantage SEM provides is the
consideration of multiple relationships simultaneously, which can help delineate how
multiple variables may be related to other variables. To use a simple analogy, single
bivariate relationships are the trees, whereas the SEM analysis may provide a better
view of the forest.

Our SEM analysis provides some interesting relationships to

consider when investigating psychological aspects of revenge and forgiveness.
As seen in Figure 1, the results of the SEM analysis confirm a number of
relationships that were observed in the correlational analyses. Specifically, the positive
relationship between impulsivity and rumination was repeated, as was the negative
relationship between rumination and forgiveness. In addition, the correlational finding
that impulsivity was positively associated with the Vengeance Scale also was
supported. However, the SEM analysis revealed some interesting relationships that
could not be observed directly in the bivariate relationships.

While impulsivity and

rumination were moderately positively correlated, their relationships to other variables
were quite different. The relationship of rumination to forgiveness (TTF) was direct and
in the negative direction. In other words, people who have a dispositional tendency to
forgive seem unlikely to ruminate about significant interpersonal transgressions.
The SEM analysis also revealed that rumination had a direct positive relationship
with the TRIM-Revenge measure. Although the Vengeance Scale and TRIM-Revenge
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measure were correlated (r = .67), no direct path was established between rumination
and the Vengeance scale. While this may appear to be trivial, its meaning may be
better understood by considering the psychological foundations upon which the
Vengeance Scale and TRIM-Revenge were constructed. The Vengeance Scale is a
measure of attitudes toward revenge.

As such, it intends to measure evaluative

judgments associated with both the general concept of revenge as well as attitudes
toward revenge as a behavior. On the other hand, TRIM-Revenge is a measure of
motivation

which

intends

to

capture

people’s

more

immediate

behavioral

intentions/reactions toward an actual person who has recently wronged them.
While it makes sense that a person who endorses revenge attitudes would be
likely to hold revenge motivations, the two concepts are not necessarily the same.
Interestingly, the Vengeance Scale does not direct the responder to think specifically
about a single person who was responsible for a specific interpersonal harm. In this
way, the measure is more indirect than the TRIM-Revenge measure. Considering that
a person’s rumination about a specific interpersonal harm might focus exclusively on the
person who caused that harm, it could be that TRIM-Revenge would be
psychometrically superior to the more general Vengeance Scale in accounting for
variance in rumination. Rumination is a specific cognitive process, which can entail
vivid recollections of people and events. When these people and events are primed, as
may have been the case with the instructions for the TRIM-Revenge measure, the direct
relationship between the two measures is more easily understood.
A final direct path was established in the SEM analysis between rumination and
TRIM-Avoidance. This finding suggests that rumination is positively associated with
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motivation to behaviorally avoid a person who has recently caused one a significant
interpersonal harm. Given that rumination is a cognitive process that can incorporate
vivid recollections of unpleasant interpersonal events, a person’s intention to
behaviorally avoid those responsible for these events appears straightforward.

In

particular, if the event associated with the ruminative thinking was traumatic or was
associated with great harm, this finding can be interpreted as one that reinforces a selfpreserving, defensive reaction.
Psychologists have been aware of defensive reactions that people exhibit when
faced with circumstances they perceive as harmful or fear provoking (for a review, see
LeDoux, 1996). Concepts such as the “fight or flight” (Cannon, 1929) response can be
easily invoked to illustrate a possible psychological explanation of this finding. Aspects
of equity theory (Adams, 1965) also seem to be relevant. One of the predictions of
equity theory is that when people become aware of a significant inequity involving the
self they may engage in a number of cognitive and/or behavioral responses. Since
situations involving interpersonal transgressions can invoke a sense of inequity; one
option for an aggrieved person is to avoid the perceived source of the inequity. The
motivation of interpersonal avoidance can be considered in the language of equity
theory as ‘leaving the field.’ In either case, interpersonal avoidance is a possible
outcome for those who experience a significant interpersonal harm. However, to better
understand these direct relationships for rumination, we should now consider the SEM
findings associated with impulsivity.
The finding that rumination was directly related to forgiveness, revenge and
avoidance provide further empirical evidence that rumination is a key cognitive variable
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to consider when investigating the psychological bases of these concepts.

These

findings are largely in line with prior research on these topics (Brown, 2004; McCullough
et al., 2001; Bies et al., 1997; Stuckless & Goranson, 1992). However, something that
has been largely unexplored in studies of revenge and forgiveness is the possible role
of impulsivity. Past research has shown that impulsivity is a key variable to consider
when accounting for a wide range of human behavior. Examples of this are numerous
and have been explored in several specialty areas of psychology, including the
physiological (Barratt, Stanford, & Kent, 1997), developmental (Côté, Tremblay, &
Nagin, 2002), clinical (Evenden, 1999) and social psychology (Emmons & Diener,
1986). At its core, the concept of impulsivity emphasizes behavioral processes that are
often performed without reference to consequences and can indicate a shallow level of
cognitive processing. Additionally, impulsive behaviors are often accompanied by high
levels of emotionality (Berlin, Rolls, & Kischka, 2004; Hinshaw, 2003).
Our findings show that impulsivity and rumination were shown to differentially
relate to individual differences in revenge attitudes and motivations, behavioral
intentions to forgive and avoidance motivations. Though the relationship of rumination
with these variables was primarily direct, the relationship to these variables associated
with impulsivity was found to be indirect. As seen in Figure 1, the specific nature of the
relationship between impulsivity and forgiveness, revenge and avoidance was mediated
by revenge attitudes (Vengeance Scale). High levels of impulsivity and prorevenge
attitudes appeared to have inhibitory effects on forgiveness, whereas high levels of
impulsivity and prorevenge attitudes appeared to have facilitative effects on revenge
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and avoidance motivations. These results suggest several interesting considerations in
regard to research concerned with identifying antecedents of forgiveness and revenge.
The experience of a significant interpersonal transgression can leave the
perceiver with a number of options to consider and possibly choose in response to the
harm-doer.

In the present research, three possible reactions were investigated:

revenge motivations, forgiveness intentions and avoidance motivations. While there
certainly are other things an aggrieved party may do in response to a transgression
(e.g., co-opting the resources of a third party to intervene on one’s behalf, or doing
nothing in response to the experienced harm), many people may be socialized into one
or more of the options investigated here.

An important question that cannot be

adequately addressed from our data asks when different options are available to an
aggrieved party, what other processes determine the person’s decision to engage in
one or more of these options? Although the present research emphasizes individual
differences as a possible roadmap for these decisions, a more basic explanation may
exist that allows for an enhanced understanding of the pattern of relationships among
the individual differences investigated in this study.
Since little previous psychological research has considered impulsivity and
rumination together as important antecedents of revenge and forgiveness, a more
precise interpretation of the present findings is somewhat difficult to achieve.
Nonetheless, two well-established social psychological theories might aid in this
interpretation. In seeking a more basic account of our findings, one should not ignore
the contributions of Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, and the
conceptually similar equity theory (Adams, 1965).

These classic theories provide
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possible avenues of inquiry to consider when attempting to understand the more basic
cognitive and affective mechanisms that may underlie the present findings.
Cognitive dissonance theory and equity theory are essentially motivation/decision
theories. Despite using different vocabularies, the emphasis in both is on psychological
balance. Cognitive dissonance is often described as an unpleasant level of arousal that
is perceived when a person experiences intrapsychic conflict. Part motivational theory,
cognitive dissonance theory also strives to explain the ways in which the individual
attempts to reduce his level of unpleasant arousal in an attempt to achieve a kind of
cognitive homeostasis. In the case of revenge and forgiveness, dissonance principles
could be used to interpret the findings. If we assume that people are motivated to
respond in some way to an interpersonal offense, and they have several alternatives
available to them, then we must consider the possibility that people may experience
some degree of dissonance over choosing one of these alternatives. On one hand, a
person may choose to forgive a transgressor, which is often viewed as prosocial and in
accordance with the principles of many religions, laws and codes of ethics. However, in
choosing to forgive, a person may leave open the possibility for future transgressions,
which would be an undesirable outcome. On the other hand, a person may choose to
strike back at a transgressor, which is often viewed as antisocial and is often in
opposition to the principles of religion, laws, etc. The revenge response, however, would
not guarantee the individual’s exclusion from future transgressions, as this action may
invoke an escalating sequence of tit-for-tat reciprocity, which also would lead to
undesirable outcomes.
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In viewing the choice between revenge and forgiveness as a dissonance
reduction problem, it is important to consider that a person’s view of the self may also
contribute to the level of dissonance associated with making a decision in response to
an interpersonal transgression. As research on the self-serving bias suggests, most
people view themselves in a positive light (for a review see, Mezulis, Abramson, &
Hyde, 2004). That is, people seem motivated to maintain a self-image that reinforces a
view of being a ‘good person.’ This perception may have the effect of adding to the level
of dissonance associated with choosing an alternative in response to an interpersonal
transgression. On one hand, ‘good’ people are ones who defend themselves against
the harms inflicted by others. On the other hand, ‘good’ people follow rules, laws, and
codes of ethics. A person’s definition of what it means to be ‘good’ might lead him
toward one behavioral choice or another, with the concomitant self-justifications after
the behavior has been enacted. While the present research did not address these
possibilities, a fruitful direction for research on revenge and forgiveness would be to
examine the function of dissonance processes as they may relate to these concepts.
Given the present findings, it appears that an understanding of pertinent individual
differences such as impulsivity and rumination might aid in solutions to cognitive
dissonance questions that may arise when a person is confronted with a choice
between revenge and forgiveness.
Concepts derived from equity theory could be even more relevant than those of
cognitive dissonance theory.

Although equity theory shares commonalities with

cognitive dissonance theory, equity theory is much more closely related to issues of
revenge and forgiveness because it specifically addresses the kinds of cognitive and
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affective responses that are likely to be experienced by a person who perceives an
interpersonal transgression.

Like cognitive dissonance theory, equity theory is

essentially a motivational theory based on people’s perceptions of the external and
internal/psychological world.

According to cognitive dissonance theory, people are

motivated to take steps to reduce the unpleasant psychological effects associated with
the dissonance produced by psychological contradictions. In the case of equity theory,
perceptions of inequity can be considered the rough equivalent of cognitive dissonance.
Equity theory, like cognitive dissonance theory, predicts that a person experiencing
perceptions of inequity will take one or more behavioral or psychological steps to reduce
the inequity, which will reduce the unpleasant psychological experience associated with
a perceived inequity.
Interpersonal transgressions can vary in kind and intensity. For example, some
transgressions can involve property; others can involve offenses against the person.
Some transgressions may be less severe (e.g., petty theft), whereas others may be
more extreme (e.g., physical assault).

Admittedly, the severity of an offense is a

judgment of the perceiver, and it is also likely that the related feelings of inequity
associated may be experienced differently. Nonetheless, interpersonal transgressions
of varying kinds and degrees could serve as triggers that lead perceivers to experience
thoughts and feelings of inequity. The thoughts and actions a person takes in response
to inequity perceptions are at the heart of equity theory. The choice to take revenge or
forgive a transgressor may therefore be seen as the individual’s attempt to reduce the
inequity produced by the transgressor.

59
In the case of revenge, a person may attempt to restore equity by acting upon
the perceived transgressor.

This is the equity theory equivalent of engaging in

behaviors that alter the inputs or outcomes of another. From an analytical perspective,
viewing revenge as an equity restoration mechanism appears straightforward.
However, considering forgiveness from an equity restoration perspective appears to be
more complex.

Surely, forgiveness can involve concrete behaviors directed at a

perceived transgressor.

For example, an aggrieved party may extend a verbal

acknowledgement of forgiveness to the transgressor or forgo pressing charges with
authorities against the transgressor.

However, these actions may not minimize the

inequity produced by the transgressor, as compensation in kind seems to remain
unachieved.
This is not to imply that an analysis of forgiveness cannot be achieved using
elements of equity theory.

Besides behavioral approaches to aid in equity restoration,

equity theory also states that people can engage in cognitive approaches to restore
equity. When evaluating the choice to forgive an interpersonal transgressor, a victim
may engage in a sort of mental equity restoration. For example, the choice to forgive
may involve a comparison between the victim and offender; but on the other hand, the
victim may seek to maintain a broader form of equity with some other referent.
Sometimes, those who forgive others do so in an attempt to maintain their perceived
equity relationship with their god or creator. Future studies should examine the extent
to which equity theory principles may apply to people’s decisions to avenge or forgive.
A major finding of this research shows that individual differences in revenge and
forgiveness may be related to impulsivity and rumination in important ways. While prior
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research has tended to emphasize the role of rumination in predicting revenge and
forgiveness, the importance of impulsivity has received much less attention.

That

revenge behavior might reflect an abrupt and potentially emotional response makes
intuitive sense. For instance, individuals who perceive an ‘in the moment’ transgression
likely experience a salient affective reaction. It is possible that negative affect could
lead them to seek revenge immediately rather than eventually. Impulsivity could be an
important antecedent of revenge oriented behavior. Additionally, these results suggest
impulsivity is negatively associated with forgiveness. Since forgiveness is often viewed
as a prosocial response to negative interpersonal events, those interested in promoting
interpersonal forgiving in lieu of the potentially destructive consequences of revenge
might consider developing techniques aimed at minimizing levels of impulsivity.
While Study 1 was an attempt to establish empirical evidence for a number of
hypothesized relationships using self-report measures, Study 2 was an exploratory
attempt to establish links between self-report measures and participants’ reaction time
to different word stimuli via an emotional Stroop task. Study 2 provided an opportunity to
engage in a novel approach to study revenge and forgiveness using an alternative set
of dependent variables. While the findings associated with Study 2 were not as robust
as those of Study 1, Study 2 did provide findings that could be used to advance future
investigations of revenge, forgiveness and justice beliefs.
The multiple regression analyses yielded some interesting results. The
Vengeance Scale was a significant predictor of RT for the Revenge and Forgiveness
word lists in the multiple regression analyses. Additionally, the Vengeance Scale
approached significance for the Justice words in the regression analyses.

These
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findings indicate the possibility of an interference relationship among these self-report
and RT measures.
As anticipated, participants scoring high on the Vengeance Scale had slower
RTs to the Revenge words. This finding can be interpreted in a couple of ways. First,
for those scoring high on the Vengeance Scale, it is possible that semantic meaning of
the Revenge words had self-referential importance. In other words, when presented
with words connoting revenge, participants’ attention may have been interrupted. It is
possible that during this attention disruption that self-relevant schemas related to
revenge may have been activated; leading to a slower reading of the word colors
(Compton, et al., 2003). Another possibility is that revenge words are indicative of
concepts or thoughts that are either chronically accessible or made temporarily salient
by a procedure such as priming.

Since priming procedures were not used in this

research, a more likely explanation is that the Vengeance Scale captured cognitions
that were chronically accessible in participants.
In the context of the present study, it was thought that words connoting revenge
might be more accessible for participants who score high on the Vengeance Scale and
TRIM-R.

When high revenge participants are presented with a word such as

“RETALIATE,” it is possible that they might have slower RTs for recognizing the word’s
color than would low revenge participants because high revenge participants would
experience a greater degree of interference. On the other hand, low revenge subjects
might be less likely to have revenge related thoughts and concepts accessible than high
revenge subjects and these differences could be observable as differences in relative
RTs for revenge relevant words.
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Past research (e.g., Gotlib & McCann, 1984) has demonstrated that individual
differences in depression predicted slower response times to depression-relevant
words, when compared to neutral and manic words. On the other hand, these authors
were able to rule out the possibility that transient emotional states were responsible for
these findings. Using a mood-induction technique, these authors found that creating a
temporary emotional state failed to lead to differences in response times on an
emotional Stroop task. Whether the explanation for the present findings is related to
attention disruption or the chronic accessibility of revenge thoughts requires additional
empirical investigation. However, if one considers the possibility that vengefulness is a
stable and enduring disposition, the findings produced by the emotional Stroop task
used in the present research are more likely to be related to more chronic cognitive
structures and processes possessed by vengeful individuals rather than to temporary
fluctuations in attention produced by the experimental procedure. Although the finding
that the Vengeance Scale predicts slower RTs for Revenge words is encouraging, the
finding that the Vengeance Scale similarly predicts the Forgiveness words is somewhat
puzzling. This leads one to consider that people with prorevenge attitudes may engage
in more similar cognitive processing of concepts related to revenge and forgiveness
than has been previously considered.
Vengeance attitudes increase response times to both revenge and forgiveness
words.

That is, the revenge emotion produces interference for both revenge and

forgiveness words. It is possible that when revenge schemas are activated, forgiveness
schemas might also be at least partially activated. If revenge is a salient emotion, it will
take longer to respond because both
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Revenge and Forgiveness words involve affective parts of the brain, as well as strictly
cognitive areas. Whether negative or positive, the affect lengthens processing time, as
compared to non-affective stimuli. While the behavioral outcomes associated with
revenge and forgiveness are very different, the cognitive processes that lead to these
behaviors may share some similarities.

This possibility should be investigated in

greater detail.
Multiple regression analyses demonstrated that rumination-intrusion was the lone
significant predictor of RT for all four of the word categories. From one perspective,
intrusive thoughts can be seen as a mechanism that may lead to a generalized form of
cognitive interference that was detected using the emotional Stroop task (Chajut, Lev, &
Algom, 2005). Since the association with rumination-intrusion did not vary significantly
across the four word categories, this interpretation appears plausible. The role of
intrusive thoughts should be more carefully considered in future RT research
investigations of revenge and forgiveness, as well as with research utilizing a modified
version of the Stroop task.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations that need to be considered. Among these are
concerns about the internal consistency reliability of the I.7 Impulsivity measure. In each
sample and order, the KR-20 values associated with this measure were somewhat low,
ranging from .54 to .60.
In addition to measurement limitations, Study 1 respondents were a
predominantly young sample of college students, the greatest proportion of who were
female (59.7%). Past research has suggested that gender may play a significant role in
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revenge, with men more typically endorsing revenge attitudes and engaging in revenge
behavior (Hutt et al., 1997). In addition, while the observed findings associated with
Study 1 are promising, their generalizability to other populations has not been
established.
It is also important to note that the interpretation of the results is limited by the
correlational nature of the data. As such, causal interpretations of the results cannot be
derived from the methods used in Study 1. Although it is possible that rumination and
impulsivity could be causal mechanisms explaining revenge, forgiveness and
avoidance, causality flowing in the opposite direction cannot be ruled out. Thus, while
the results show important initial associations, experimental studies will be needed to
establish any causal relationships among these variables.
Finally, another concern is the failure to find relationships with the just world
beliefs measures (DJW and PJW).

The only exception was a significant positive

correlation between PJW and TTF. The lack of significant associations among DJW,
PJW and other measures could be attributable to the order in which the various
measures were presented to the participants. In previously published research (Lucas,
et al., 2007, Lucas, et al., 2008) DJW and PJW were first in the sequence of measures.
In Study 1, DJW and PJW appeared after the revenge measures. In the first part of
Study 2, participants completed the DJW and PJW measures first.

When these

measures were presented first, the significant association between PJW and TTF
emerged.
Perhaps more important is the lack of specificity of the justice measures used in
this research. For example, BJW measures used in the present research emphasized
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generalized just world beliefs about others. Since the revenge and forgiveness scales
used dealt only with the self, specific just world measures dealing with the self might be
more predictive of revenge and forgiveness. We used the original PJW-DJW measure
first reported in 2007 in Lucas et al. That measure asked about justice received by
other people. However, the other measures we gave to our participants asked about
revenge, forgiveness, etc. in oneself. Very recent research (Lucas, et al., 2010) shows
that people can have different just world beliefs about themselves than for others, and
this is true for both DJW and PJW. Lucas, et al. (2010) show that these different just
world beliefs for the self vs. others relate differently to social attitudes and to feelings of
personal well-being. Thus, using the new “self” just world measures may be more
appropriate for future research on revenge and forgiveness.
The findings presented here extend thinking on revenge and forgiveness.
Hopefully they have illustrated some of the difficulties in studying these concepts as well
as providing additional avenues of inquiry. While it may be difficult to disentangle the
variables and processes involved with the psychology of revenge and forgiveness, it is
important that we embrace the challenge.
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Appendix A: Vengeance Scale
Listed below are a number of statements that describe attitudes that different people have. There
are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. Read each item and decide whether you agree or
disagree and to what extent. If you strongly agree circle 7; if you strongly disagree circle 1; if
you feel somewhere in between circle any one of the numbers between 1 and 7. If you feel
neutral or undecided, the midpoint is 4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Disagree strongly
Disagree
Disagree slightly
Neither disagree nor agree
Agree slightly
Agree
Agree strongly

disagree

agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It’s not worth my time or effort to pay back
someone who has wronged me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is important for me to get back at people who
have hurt me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I try to even the score with anyone who hurts
me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is always better not to seek vengeance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I live by the motto “Let bygones be bygones.”

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

There is nothing wrong in getting back at
someone who has hurt you.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I don’t just get mad, I get even.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I find it easy to forgive those who have hurt me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I am not a vengeful person.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I believe in the motto “An eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth.”

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Revenge is morally wrong.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If someone causes me trouble, I’ll find a way to
make them regret it.
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If I am wronged, I can’t live with myself unless I
get revenge.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Honor requires that you get back at someone
who has hurt you.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is usually better to show mercy than to take
revenge.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Anyone who provokes me deserves the
punishment that I give them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is always better to “turn the other cheek.”

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

To have a desire for vengeance would make me
feel ashamed.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Revenge is sweet.
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Appendix B: Transgression Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory
For questions on this page, please indicate your current thoughts and feelings about a person who
recently hurt you. Use the following scale to indicate your agreement with each of the questions.
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly agree

1.

I’ll make him/her pay.

2.

I wish that something bad would happen to him/her.

3.

I want him/her to get what he/she deserves.

4.

I’m going to get even.

5.

I want to see him/her hurt and miserable.

6.

I keep as much distance between us as possible.

7.

I live as if he/she doesn’t exist, isn’t around.

8.

I don’t trust him/her.

9.

I find it difficult to act warmly toward him/her.

10.

I avoid him/her.

11.

I cut off the relationship with him/her.

12.

I withdraw from him/her.
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Appendix C: Impact of Event Scale
Listed below are a number of statements that describe thoughts that different people have when
somebody has offended them. There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. Read each
item and decide whether you agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strongly agree circle
7; if you strongly disagree circle 1; if you feel somewhere in between circle any one of the
numbers between 1 and 7. If you feel neutral or undecided, the midpoint is 4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Disagree strongly
Disagree
Disagree slightly
Neither disagree nor agree
Agree slightly
Agree
Agree strongly

disagree

agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I thought about it when I didn't mean to

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I avoided letting myself get upset when I thought
about it or was reminded of it
I tried to remove it from memory

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I had trouble falling asleep or staying asleep
because of pictures or thoughts about it that came
into my mind
I had waves of strong feelings about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I had dreams about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I stayed away from reminders of it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I felt as if it hadn't happened or wasn't real

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I tried not to talk about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Pictures about it popped into my mind

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Other things kept making me think about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I was aware that I still had a lot of feelings about it,
but I didn't deal with them

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I tried not to think about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Any reminder brought back feelings about it

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

My feelings about it were kind of numb
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Appendix D: I.7 Impulsivity Scale
Instructions: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the “YES” or the “NO”
following the questions. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work
quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the question.

Do you often buy things on impulse?

Yes

No

Do you generally do and say things without stopping to think?

Yes

No

Do you often get into a jam because you do things without thinking?

Yes

No

Are you an impulsive person?

Yes

No

Do you usually think carefully before doing anything?

Yes

No

Do you often do things on the spur of the moment?

Yes

No

Do you mostly speak before thinking things out?

Yes

No

Do you often get involved in things you later wish you could get out of?

Yes

No

Do you get so “carried away” by new and exciting ideas that you never think of
possible snags?

Yes

No

Do you need to use a lot of self-control to keep out of trouble?

Yes

No

Would you agree that almost everything enjoyable is illegal or immoral?

Yes

No

Are you often surprised at people’s reactions to what you do or say?

Yes

No

Do you think an evening out is more successful if it is unplanned or arranged at
the last moment?

Yes

No

Do you usually work quickly, without bothering to check?

Yes

No

Do you often change your interests?

Yes

No

Before making up your mind, do you consider all the advantages and
disadvantages?

Yes

No

Do you prefer to “sleep on it” before making decisions?

Yes

No

When people shout at you, do you shout back?

Yes

No

Do you usually make up your mind quickly?

Yes

No
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Appendix E: Tendency to Forgive Scale
Listed below are a number of statements that describe thoughts that different people have.
There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. Read each item and decide whether you
agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strongly agree circle 7; if you strongly disagree
circle 1; if you feel somewhere in between circle any one of the numbers between 1 and 7. If
you feel neutral or undecided, the midpoint is 4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Disagree strongly
Disagree
Disagree slightly
Neither disagree nor agree
Agree slightly
Agree
Agree strongly

disagree

agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I tend to get over it quickly when someone hurts
my feelings

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

If someone wrongs me, I often think about it a lot
afterward

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have a tendency to harbor grudges

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

When people wrong me, my approach is just to
forgive and forget
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Appendix F: Attitudes Toward Forgiveness Scale
Listed below are a number of statements that describe thoughts that different people have.
There are no right or wrong answers, only opinions. Read each item and decide whether you
agree or disagree and to what extent. If you strongly agree circle 7; if you strongly disagree
circle 1; if you feel somewhere in between circle any one of the numbers between 1 and 7. If
you feel neutral or undecided, the midpoint is 4.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)

Disagree strongly
Disagree
Disagree slightly
Neither disagree nor agree
Agree slightly
Agree
Agree strongly

disagree

agree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I believe that forgiveness is a moral virtue

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Justice is more important than mercy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

It is admirable to be a forgiving person

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have no problem at all with people staying mad
at those who hurt them
Forgiveness is a sign of weakness

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

People should work harder than they do to let go
of the wrongs they have suffered
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Appendix G: Procedural and Distributive Just World Items
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Slightly
Disagree

Neutral

Slightly
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.

I feel that people are
generally treated
according to fair
processes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

2.

People usually use fair
procedures in dealing
with others.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3.

I feel that people
generally use methods
that are fair in their
evaluations of others.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4.

Regardless of the
specific outcomes they
receive, people are
generally subjected to
fair procedures

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5.

People are generally
subjected to processes
that are fair.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

6.

I feel that people
generally earn the
rewards and
punishments that they
get in this world.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7.

People usually receive
the outcomes that they
deserve.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8.

Regardless of the
processes used, people
usually receive fair
outcomes.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9.

People generally
deserve the things that
they are accorded.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel that people usually
receive the outcomes
that they are due.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

10.

Notes. Items 1-5 = Procedural Just World; items 6-10 = Distributive Just World. Additionally, items 1 and
8 were not scored in Studies 1 & 2.
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Appendix H: Emotional Stroop Words List

Justice Words
Deserve, Equality, Fairness, Justice
Revenge Words
Retaliate, Retribution, Revenge, Vengeance
Forgiveness Words
Compassion, Forgive, Forgiveness, Mercy
Neutral Words
Carpet, Kitchen, Mirror, Sailboat
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Table 1
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas among Individual Differences Measures used in
Study 1, Order 1 (N=107).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Vengeance Scale
Impulsivity
Rumination
ATF
TTF
PJW
DJW
Revenge (TRIM)
Avoidance (TRIM)

M

SD

α

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

64.45
8.31
66.73
31.70
15.91
13.61
17.04
12.33
24.27

19.73
3.12
12.99
5.24
5.67
4.82
5.28
4.83
6.93

.91
.60
.77
.67
.80
.87
.90
.88
.90


.48***
.05
-.60***
-.57***
-.05
-.04
.78***
.20*


.20*
-.37***
-.31***
.06
+
.16
.49***
.08


-.15
-.36***
.10
.05
+
.17
.23*


.43***
.05
.13
-.52***
-.33***


.05
.03
-.50***
-.25**

Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.

6.


.37***
.03
.13

7.


.14
-.02

8.

9.


.30***
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Table 2
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas among Individual Differences Measures used in
Study 1, Order 2 (N=93).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Vengeance Scale
Impulsivity
Rumination
ATF
TTF
PJW
DJW
Revenge (TRIM)
Avoidance (TRIM)

M

SD

α

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

69.10
9.06
64.87
28.90
15.30
14.45
15.77
13.59
26.57

22.55
3.13
14.22
5.83
5.73
5.28
5.44
5.24
6.03

.93
.55
.85
.69
.76
.89
.85
.85
.87


.40***
.16
-.68***
-.53***
.06
.09
.55***
.14


+
.18
-.36***
-.26**
-.29***
-.08
+
.20
.15


-.14
-.26**
-.03
.02
.28**
.30**


.34***
-.02
.01
-.37***
-.12


-.01
-.01
-.35***
-.03


.53***
.11
-.14


.15
-.06


.28**



Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 3
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas among Individual Differences Measures used in
Study 1, Orders 1 & 2 (N=200).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Vengeance Scale
Impulsivity
Rumination
ATF
TTF
PJW
DJW
Revenge (TRIM)
Avoidance (TRIM)

M

SD

α

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

66.61
8.66
65.87
30.40
15.63
14.00
16.45
12.92
25.34

21.16
3.14
13.57
5.68
5.69
5.05
5.38
5.05
6.61

.92
.58
.81
.70
.78
.88
.88
.87
.89


.44***
.10
-.65***
-.55***
.02
.02
.67***
.19**


.18*
-.38***
-.29***
-.10
.03
.36***
+
.13


+
-.12
-.31***
.03
.04
.22**
.25***


.39***
-.01
.09
-.44***
-.27***


.02
.01
-.44***
-.16*


.43***
.08
.02


.13
-.06


.31***



Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.
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Table 4
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas among Individual Differences Measures used in
Study 2 (N=145).

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Vengeance Scale
Impulsivity
Rumination
ATF
TTF
PJW
DJW
Revenge (TRIM)
Avoidance (TRIM)

M

SD

α

1.

62.13
7.93
67.15
31.32
15.82
20.40
20.46
11.25
24.97

20.28
3.21
12.45
5.35
4.70
6.13
5.96
4.72
6.34

.92
.60
.79
.68
.65
.89
.89
.87
.89


.17*
.05
-.66***
-.45***
-.11
.01
.67***
.23**

Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.

2.

.28***
-.05
-.08
-.04
.07
.27***
.22**

3.

4.

5.


.04
-.26***
-.12
-.05
.29***
.39***


.39***
.04
-.07
-.48***
-.20*


.19*
.11
-.39***
-.36***

6.


.58***
-.11
-.11

7.


.04
.02

8.

9.


.38***
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Table 5
Zero-Order Correlations, Means, Standard Deviations and Cronbach’s Alphas among Individual Differences Measures used in
Studies 1 & 2 (N=345).
M
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Vengeance Scale
Impulsivity
Rumination
ATF
TTF
PJW
DJW
Revenge (TRIM)
Avoidance (TRIM)

64.73
8.35
66.41
30.79
15.71
18.77
20.25
12.21
18.77

SD

α

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

20.28
3.19
13.11
5.56
5.29
6.29
6.16
4.98
6.49

.92
.59
.80
.69
.74
.89
.88
.87
.89


.34***
.07
-.66***
-.51***
-.06
.02
.67***
.21***


.20***
-.25***
-.21***
+
-.10
.05
.33***
.17**


-.06
-.29***
-.01
.01
.23***
.30***


.39***
.02
.02
-.46***
-.24***


.08
.05
-.42***
-.23***


.51***
-.03
-.04

Notes. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.

7.


.09
-.04

8.

9.


.34***
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Table 6
Impulsivity and Rumination Predicting Vengeance, Revenge, Forgiveness and Avoidance. (N = 345).
Model
1. All Paths
2. Remove Impulsivity to Vengeance
3. Remove Rumination to Vengeance
4. TTF, TRIM-R and TRIM-A with Impulsivity
Direct Effect Removed
5. TTF, TRIM-R,TRIM-A and Vengeance with
Rumination Direct Effect Removed

χ2

df

NNFI

CFI

RMSEA

SRMR

0.00
46.57
1.34

0
1
1

1.00
.48
.99

1.00
.90
.99

0.00
.36
.03

0.00
.10
.02

4.56

4

.99

.99

.02

.02

71.73

7

.68

.85

.16

.11

Notes. NNFI = Non-Normed Fit Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; SRMR = Standard Root-Mean Square Residual;
RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
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Table 7
Standardized Total, Direct and Indirect Effects of Impulsivity and Rumination (N = 345).
Impulsivity

Rumination

Vengeance
Total
Direct
Indirect

.43***
***
.43
--

----

TRIM-R
Total
Direct
Indirect

.37
-***
.37

***

.28***
.28***
--

TTF
Total
Direct
Indirect

-.24***
--.24***

-.37***
***
-.37
--

TRIM-A
Total
Direct
Indirect

.07***
-.07***

.31***
***
.31
--

Note. ***p < .001.
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Table 8
Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses for Individual Differences Measures Predicting Reaction Time Scores on Emotional
Stroop Task (N = 89).
Revenge Words
Variable
Vengeance Scale
TRIM-Revenge
ATF
TTF
Impulsivity
Intrusion
2
R
2
Adjusted R
F

B
1.67
-1.95
3.68
.51
-1.48
3.09

SE B
.70
2.44
2.38
2.31
2.98
1.24
.13
.07
+
2.07

Note. +p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01.

Forgiveness Words
β

B
*

.38
-.11
.23
.03
.03
*
.29

1.62
-1.92
2.76
.78
1.32
2.59

SE B
.69
2.40
2.34
2.28
2.94
1.22
.13
.06
+
1.97

Justice Words
β

B
*

.37
-.11
.18
.04
.05
*
.25

1.40
-2.17
1.92
.07
3.25
2.97

SE B
.73
2.55
2.49
2.42
3.12
1.30
.14
.08
*
2.27

Neutral Words
β

B
+

.30
-.11
.11
.01
.12
*
.27

.96
-.56
2.83
1.86
.33
3.26

SE B
.68
2.37
2.32
2.25
2.90
1.21
.12
.06
+
1.89

Β
.22
-.03
.18
.11
.01
**
.32
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Predictors Used in Multiple Regression Analyses of Study 2 Data (N = 89).
Measure
Vengeance Scale
I.7 Impulsivity
Rumination-Intrusion
Attitudes Toward Forgiveness
Tendency to Forgive
TRIM-Revenge

M

SD

59.76

18.18

7.36

3.05

30.87

7.67

31.24

5.07

15.80

4.46

10.62

4.45
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Figure 1
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Revenge and forgiveness are commonplace aspects of social interaction. Past
research has emphasized that rumination is an important cognitive correlate of both
revenge and forgiveness.

In the present research, we examined whether revenge

attitudes and motivations, as well as forgiveness attitudes and tendencies might also be
predicted by impulsivity. Two studies were conducted to investigate these possibilities.
In Study 1 participants (N = 200) completed individual differences measures of
impulsivity, rumination, procedural and distributive just world beliefs, and measures of
revenge, forgiveness and avoidance.

Structural equation modeling revealed that

rumination predicted forgiveness tendencies, revenge motivations and avoidance.
Additionally, revenge attitudes were found to mediate the relationship between
impulsivity and forgiveness tendencies, revenge motivations and avoidance. Study 2
was an exploratory attempt to determine whether the self-report individual differences
measures used in Study 1 would predict participants’ reaction times on a modified
Stroop task. Specifically, participants (N = 145) completed the same self-report
measures used in Study 1. After completing the self-report measures, 100 participants
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completed a modified Stroop task where they were asked to name the color of 16
unique words from four categories: revenge, forgiveness, justice and neutral. Multiple
regression analyses indicated that revenge attitudes predicted slower color naming
reaction times to the revenge and forgiveness word categories.

Additionally,

rumination-intrusion predicted slower color naming reaction times across all word
categories. The combined findings indicate that cognitive and affective variables such
as rumination and impulsivity are important to consider in future investigations of
revenge and forgiveness. Limitations, as well as directions for future research also are
discussed.
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